



Human Rights Council
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review
Fifty-first session
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Summary of stakeholders' submissions on Rwanda*

Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

I. Background

1. The present report was prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 5/1 and 16/21, taking into consideration the periodicity of the universal periodic review and the outcome of the previous review.¹ It is a summary of 32 stakeholders' submissions² for the universal periodic review, presented in a summarized manner owing to word-limit constraints. A separate section is provided for the contribution by the national human rights institution that is accredited in full compliance with the Paris Principles.

II. Information provided by the national human rights institution accredited in full compliance with the Paris Principles

2. NCHR stated that:

(a) Although its annual budget had steadily increased, more funding was required to enable NCHR to carry out its mandate, including the mandate of the National Preventative Mechanism;³

(b) Despite submitting an evaluation of the National Human Rights Action Plan (2017-2020) to the Ministry of Justice in 2021 as part of the process of finalizing a second national human rights action plan, this second plan was yet to be finalized;⁴

(c) Detention facilities were overcrowded;⁵

(d) The law governing non-governmental organizations, as revised in 2024, hindered the freedom of association; and NCHR emphasised the importance of non-governmental organizations managing their own assets to preserve their independence;⁶ and that

(e) Terminology in the legislation on the rights of persons with disabilities was inconsistent with CRPD.⁷

* The present document is being issued without formal editing.



III. Information provided by other stakeholders

A. Scope of international obligations⁸ and cooperation with human rights mechanisms

3. ERF stated that Rwanda had yet to ratify ICPED and to become a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.⁹
4. ICAN urged Rwanda to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.¹⁰
5. UFR stated that Rwanda was uniquely positioned to strengthen the African Court on Human and People's Rights and should affirm its support for the Court in the upcoming review.¹¹

B. National human rights framework

1. Constitutional and legislative framework

6. JS2 stated Rwanda should align relevant laws and policies with the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, which Rwanda had ratified, and relevant international human rights standards.¹²
7. JS10 stated that the draft healthcare services bill had presented an opportunity to address gaps in protection and services available to LGBTIQ+ persons and the bill, once enacted, should affirm the rights of transgender and non-binary persons, particularly regarding gender-affirming care.¹³
8. JS2 stated that there was a need for an effective legal and institutional framework to regulate the use of national identity documents, as they were being used to access services and make online electronic transactions.¹⁴

2. Institutional infrastructure and policy measures

9. JS11 stated that, except in civil, commercial, labour and administrative cases, NCHR did not have the authority to institute legal action on behalf of citizens, and to issue enforceable decisions. Also, NCHR had yet to publish any annual reports on torture, since its designation as a national preventative mechanism in 2018.¹⁵
10. HRF stated that despite its record of human rights abuses, Rwanda had enjoyed a relatively positive perception on the international stage, due to concerted image-control efforts. According to HRF, involvement in sport had long been used to gain positive press and distract from Rwanda's human rights record, including through the sponsorship of several major European football teams through its "Visit Rwanda" campaign to promote tourism.¹⁶

C. Promotion and protection of human rights

1. Implementation of international human rights obligations, taking into account applicable international humanitarian law

Equality and non-discrimination

11. JS11 stated that patriarchal attitudes had remained an obstacle in attaining gender equality. Discriminatory cultural practices and norms had inhibited the full realization of gender equality and women's empowerment.¹⁷
12. Noting that discrimination was criminalized pursuant to Article 163 of the law entitled Determining Offences and Penalties in General (Law N°72/2018), JS8 expressed concern that discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity had been omitted from the enumerated acts that constituted the crime of discrimination.¹⁸

Right to life, liberty and security of person, and freedom from torture

13. HRW noted that several recommendations from the previous review relating to the conducting of independent investigations into all allegations of enforced disappearances, arbitrary and prolonged detentions, extrajudicial executions, and torture and ill-treatment in detention centres, had not been supported by Rwanda, and recalled the Government's response that such allegations had always been investigated. However, research had shown that Rwanda had not conducted credible and effective investigations into most allegations of extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment, and had not prosecuted alleged perpetrators.¹⁹

14. JS11 noted the persistence of cases of arbitrary arrest and detention allegedly committed by security forces.²⁰

15. HRF stated that Rwanda had a significant record of extending the reach of repression beyond its borders in violation of the human rights of dissidents outside of its territorial jurisdiction and cited alleged cases in that regard including cases of execution. Also, to silence critics abroad, the Authorities had targeted relatives within the country, with family members facing surveillance and harassment.²¹

16. HRW stated that allegations of torture and ill-treatment of detainees in both official and unofficial facilities had been documented. Former detainees had described the ordeal they had faced in Rubavu and Nyarugenge prisons, including being submerged into a tank of dirty water, and beaten. HRW stated that it had found a pattern of ill-treatment, mock executions, beatings, and torture at an unofficial detention centre.²² ERF also raised the persistence of torture and ill-treatment in the context of detention.²³

17. ERF stated that conditions in prisons and detention centres were sub-standard due to overcrowding and limited access to food, water and healthcare, among others, and lacked compliance with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules).²⁴

International humanitarian law

18. HRW stated that Rwanda had provided military and logistical support to the M23 armed group since the group's resurgence in 2021 in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo, including as the group took control of Goma and Bukavu, the provincial capitals of North and South Kivu, in 2025. According to HRW, Rwanda had effective control over much of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo through its own armed forces and the M23 armed group, which would appear to have met the international humanitarian law standards for a belligerent occupation.²⁵

19. HRW stated that from 2021, Rwanda-backed M23 armed group had been responsible for many violations, including summary executions, sexual violence, looting, and forcible transfers of populations the Democratic Republic of Congo.²⁶

20. HRW stated that the Rwandan military had also been directly involved in violations of international humanitarian law in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo and that unlawful attacks by Rwandan forces and the M23 armed group had been documented.²⁷

21. JAI stated that on 27 June 2025, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo signed an accord to bring an end to the conflict, halt the use of armed proxies and work together to develop the natural resources along their shared border. However, accountability for human right violations remained to be addressed.²⁸

Administration of justice, including impunity, and the rule of law

22. OIAD stated that the Executive Branch of the Government had exercised control over the courts, thus undermining the decision-making autonomy of the judges. In addition, the special courts, composed of members appointed by the President of Rwanda, were not subject to independent judicial review.²⁹

23. HRW stated that the Authorities had misused the judiciary to silence critics by abusively bringing charges of "spreading false information or harmful propaganda with intent

to cause a hostile international opinion against [the] Rwandan Government” against the political opposition and independent media who had challenged official narratives that were incompatible with human rights obligations.³⁰

24. OIAD stated that the rights to fair trial and an effective defence, although constitutionally guaranteed, had been frequently violated. Accused in political cases had either been deprived of legal representation or had been forced to accept lawyers chosen by the Executive Branch of the Government. In addition, military courts, whose jurisdiction should be limited to cases involving military personnel, had routinely conducted trials of civilians. Such cases had been marked by the lack of publicity, the denial of access to legal representation during the pre-trial phase, and the impossibility of appealing decisions.³¹

25. OIAD stated that the role of the lawyer had been undermined by a system that had prevented lawyers from carrying out their functions, including by limiting access to files and either severely restricting or making it impossible to communicate with clients, especially in cases where their clients had been held in secret places of detention or in safe houses run by the secret service. In addition, lawyers who had represented political opponents or people perceived as being critical of the Government had been systematically assimilated to their clients, which had led to their denial of access to places of detention, threats of suspension from legal practice, and surveillance. Lawyers had also been arbitrarily arrested and interrogated by military intelligence officials and had been pressured to either withdraw from or refuse cases.³²

26. HRW stated that Judges had routinely ignored complaints from detainees about unlawful detention and ill-treatment in detention facilities, and that NCHR’s inability or unwillingness to report on cases of torture had created an environment of near-total impunity.³³

27. JS11 stated that due to the limited financial and human resources for the criminal justice system, justice for many people, especially those in need of legal aid, had been delayed.³⁴ JS10 stated that there were gaps in access to justice for sexual and gender minorities, with many LGBTIQ+ persons continuing to face barriers in accessing justice.³⁵ JS11 noted that the Justice for Children Policy 2014 had not been implemented and there was no framework for compensating victims of child abuse.³⁶

Fundamental freedoms and the right to participate in public and political life

28. ECLJ expressed concern that since the previous review, legislation and regulations had been introduced to govern religious organizations which conflicted with constitutionally guaranteed religious freedom.³⁷

29. WEA stated that the law entitled Determining the Organisation and Functioning of Faith-based Organisations (Law No.72/2018), which established the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) and prescribed registration requirements for faith-based organizations, was not in compliance with international human rights standards. In 2024, RGB had inspected more than 13,000 churches and houses of prayer, which led to the closure more than 8,000 churches and houses of prayer.³⁸ In that regard, JS1 highlighted the closure of places of Worship of Jehovah’s Witnesses and ECLJ the closure of Pentecostal and revival churches.³⁹ WEA stated that in 2025, RGB had promulgated new regulations which had imposed further restrictions on faith-based organizations.⁴⁰

30. FLD stated that although freedom of expression was constitutionally guaranteed, it was significantly constrained in practice, with restrictions framed as measures to preserve unity and national cohesion in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. This had led to an environment in which dissent was discouraged, and critical voices suppressed.⁴¹

31. JS6 stated that the Authorities had routinely targeted journalists, human rights defenders, and political opponents who had expressed critical views. Those who had documented human rights violations, exposed corruption, or criticised state policies had faced arbitrary arrest, surveillance, smear campaigns, enforced disappearances, and, in some cases, extrajudicial killings. JS13 stated that in 2024, pro-government trolls and AI-generated content were used to harass and discredit government critics and opponents.⁴²

32. JS12 stated that the major online and broadcast media were either state-run or largely pro-government and that outspoken independent newspapers no longer existed. The few private outlets that existed had often practiced self-censorship.⁴³

33. HRW stated that at the previous review, Rwanda had supported 13 recommendations on freedom of expression and access to information, including on creating an enabling and safe environment for journalists and activists, and on repealing provisions restricting free speech. Rwanda had failed to implement those recommendations.⁴⁴ JS6 and JS12 also considered those recommendations to have not been implemented.⁴⁵

34. JS2 referred to five relevant supported recommendations from the previous review and stated that Rwandan law had continued to contain provisions that unduly restricted freedom of speech and expression and were used to target journalist and human rights defenders.⁴⁶

35. JS4 stated that the Media Law (No. 02/2013), which was supposed to provide a framework to protect press freedom, remained restrictive, inter alia, requiring journalists to obtain accreditation from state institutions, rather than from independent, self-regulatory bodies. JS9 stated that this Law lacked a clear and inclusive definition of who qualified as a journalist, which created ambiguity especially for digital content creators. JS12 recalled that at the previous review a recommendation to amend Article 2(19) to broaden the definition of a journalist to include citizen journalists and bloggers had not been supported by Rwanda. JS4 stated that the Information Communication and Technology (ICT) Law (No. 24/2016) continued to restrict online activities and infringed freedom of expression.⁴⁷

36. JS12 stated that Rwanda had continued to censor online content deemed critical of the Government. Decisions to block websites had been taken extra-judicially by state agencies absent of transparency and a clear legal process.⁴⁸ The social media online publishing platform, Medium, had been blocked, while the ruling party's extensive influence on social media had continued to grow through pro-government on-line commentators referred to as the "Twitter Brigade".⁴⁹

37. JS6 stated that the Law on the Prevention of Cybercrime (No. 60/2018), inter alia, imposed severe sentences and fines for anyone who established, published or used a site of a "terrorist group". By designating many exiled opposition organizations as "terrorist groups", the Government used this Law to suppress political dissent and silence opposition, both domestically and abroad.⁵⁰

38. Noting that the Constitution⁵¹ and the ICCPR, to which Rwanda was a state party, guaranteed the right to freedom of association, JS4 stated that the effectiveness of this guarantee was restricted by Law Governing Non-Governmental Organisations (Law No. 058/2024). This Law conferred on RGB discretionary powers over the registration, internal governance and financial operations of civil society organizations, without any explicit availability of legal recourse mechanisms. Article 7 of the Law allowed RGB to deny registration on vague grounds such as "peace", "security" and "good morals", terms that lacked precise legal definition. YDHRA stated that LGBTIQI groups who had attempted to register under names explicitly identifying their gender identity or sexual orientation had consistently been denied registration for vague reasons related to public morality or cultural values. JS4 stated that Article 12 prohibited 'political activities' without clearly defining what constituted such activity and thus created a chilling effect for organisations engaged in governance or human rights work. Article 22 limited the membership of national civil society organizations to a maximum of three umbrella organizations.⁵² JS6 expressed similar views and added that Article 9 of the Law required government approval for internal matters such as leadership appointments, amendments to statutes, and changes to objectives or programmes, thus interfering with the autonomy of non-governmental organizations to govern their own affairs. In sum, this Law fell significantly short of safeguarding the right to freedom of association and instead introduced new avenues for State interference and control over civil society.⁵³

39. JS4 stated that there were no independent mechanisms to investigate threats of reprisals against human rights defenders, despite the Constitution providing for their protection.⁵⁴ FLD stated that laws prescribing vaguely defined offences had been used to criminalize the work of human rights defenders and that they had been subjected to politically

motivated prosecution on unclear changes in prolonged proceedings with limited judicial safeguards.⁵⁵

40. JS9 recalled that at the previous review, Rwanda had supported recommendations relating to civic space and human rights defenders and considered the implementation of those recommendations to be incomplete. It urged Rwanda to establish and uphold, in law and practice, a supporting environment for civil society. JS9 invited Rwanda to ensure that individuals and organizations could operate without undue state interference, and to facilitate their meaningful cooperation with international and regional human rights mechanisms.⁵⁶

41. JS6 stated that although the Constitution guaranteed the right to form, join, and operate political parties, the Government maintained strict control over the political space, and employed legal and judicial measures to obstruct, intimidate, and silence political opponents.⁵⁷

42. HRW stated that in July 2024, the President of Rwanda had won his fourth term of office with 99 percent of the vote, further consolidating the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front's political power. Other political parties had faced obstacles in contesting the election.⁵⁸ HRF stated that opposition candidates had been barred from running for election, and that the government-controlled RGB had the discretion to deny party registration, making Rwanda a de facto one-party state.⁵⁹

43. JS12 stated that the cost of internet services was expensive, which JS13 attributed to high taxes.⁶⁰ JS2 stated that the protection of human rights online had deteriorated since the previous review, particularly in the lead up to the general election in July 2024 where there had been heightened censorship of online criticism.⁶¹

44. JS12 stated that the implementation of a supported recommendation from the previous review on the compliance of government agencies with the Law Relating to Access to Information (Law No. 04/2013), had remained weak and that there was no institution specifically tasked with monitoring or enforcing compliance with this Law.⁶²

Right to privacy

45. JS13 stated that the Law relating to the Protection of Personal Data and Privacy (Law No. 058/2021) was weak and fell short of providing strong provisions on judicial oversight, redress mechanisms, and transparency in the conduct of government surveillance.⁶³

46. JS2 stated that mass surveillance was institutionalised in law, which regulated interception of communications and required service providers to ensure that systems were technically capable of supporting interceptions.⁶⁴

47. HRF stated that Rwanda was a leading consumer of the NSO Group-produced Pegasus spyware and similar forms of electronic surveillance. JS2 stated that credible reports had indicated that the Government had deployed Pegasus against political opponents and human rights defenders, including members of the diaspora.⁶⁵

Prohibition of all forms of slavery, including trafficking in persons

48. IBAHRI stated that Rwanda was a source, transit and destination country for trafficking in persons, with both domestic and cross-border patterns of exploitation;⁶⁶ and that there were critical gaps in the implementation of the Law on the Prevention, Suppression and Punishment of Trafficking in Persons and Exploitation of Others (Law No. 51/2018) and the national action plan.⁶⁷

49. JS11 expressed concern about the limited knowledge and skills of investigators and prosecutors working on cases of trafficking in persons.⁶⁸ IBAHRI stated that there was inconsistent victim-witness support, poor evidence gathering, and insufficient training for investigators and prosecutors in handling complex trafficking cases.⁶⁹

Right to work and to just and favourable conditions of work

50. JS7 stated that the full development of youth talent and their successful integration into the employment landscape had been impeded by weaknesses which included a

persistent skills mismatch between youth graduates' qualifications and the requirements of the labour market.⁷⁰

51. JS11 stated that due to the lack of a legal framework governing the informal sector, workers in the informal sector had not been protected from poor working conditions and had no access to social security benefits.⁷¹

Right to an adequate standard of living

52. JS11 stated that in 2024, the national poverty rate in Rwanda was 27.4 percent, which meant that 3.6 million Rwandans lived below the poverty line.⁷²

53. ACHPR stated that additional efforts were required to implement the objective of Agenda 2063 relating to modern agriculture for increased productivity.⁷³

Right to health

54. Referring to two supported recommendations from the previous review on maternal healthcare, JS3 stated that women and girls had continued to face challenges in accessing timely and adequate antenatal and postnatal care. While some investment in maternal health infrastructure had been made, access to maternal health services had remained limited outside the capital.⁷⁴

55. JS3 recalled that at the previous review, two recommendations on access to termination of pregnancy had not enjoyed the support of Rwanda and stated that unsafe abortions had significantly contributed to maternal deaths and that the criminalization of abortion exacerbated challenges in accessing safe abortion services.⁷⁵

56. Referring to relevant supported recommendations from the previous review, inter alia, pertaining to the right to the highest attainable standard of health, comprehensive sexuality education and teenage pregnancy, JS3 stated that barriers had continued to exist that contributed to the violation of the rights of women and girls, which included the legal requirement of third-party consent for access to sexual and reproductive health services and the lack of training for service providers on adolescent-specific sexual and reproductive health services.⁷⁶ JS7 noted the persistence of high rates of adolescent pregnancies, driven by a complex interplay of socio-economic disadvantages, cultural norms, and limited access to integrated, youth-friendly sexual and reproductive health services and comprehensive sexuality education.⁷⁷

57. JS3 stated that Rwanda had achieved relative success in its HIV response and has achieved UNAIDS 95-95-95 targets but highlighted the need to reinforce prevention strategies due to the emergence of new cases.⁷⁸ HDI stated that the sharing of contaminated needles for injected drug use was a primary driver of HIV transmission. The criminalization of drug-use was a barrier to access health care and discouraged those in need from seeking help.⁷⁹

Right to education

58. CUI expressed concern about low rates of learning outcomes in literacy and numeracy.⁸⁰

59. JS7 stated that the effectiveness of teacher training had been hampered by a lack of a formal proficiency assessment and that a significant number of teachers had remained untrained.⁸¹ ERF stated that teachers had continued to struggle with teaching in English, which was the official language of instruction, and lacked an understanding on how to create tailored educational plans that catered to the varying educational needs of children.⁸²

60. ERF stated that classrooms were overcrowded, and many schools were not fully equipped and lacked appropriate educational materials to accommodate children with disabilities.⁸³

61. JS7 stated that a significant proportion of the youth had remained outside the formal education system or had failed to complete their education, and that systemic barriers had prevented the youth from acquiring basic foundational skills.⁸⁴ BC stated that changes in family structure such as death, migration, illness, or divorce, or existing socioeconomic

conditions such as parents' educational attainment, parents' occupation, and family income levels, had a profound effect on the continuity of education for children.⁸⁵

62. JS7 stated that while a legal framework for religious freedom existed, its practical application within educational settings had been inconsistent and placed children in a difficult position where they had to choose between their right to education and their deeply held religious convictions. Such dilemmas had created internal conflict for children and had impacted their sense of identity, belonging, and trust in institutions.⁸⁶

Development, the environment, and business and human rights

63. CUI referred to a relevant supported recommendation from the previous review and commended Rwanda for adopting a progressive stance on climate change. However, it was concerned by the lack of consideration for the rights of the child in environmental impact assessments and environmental policy-making processes.⁸⁷

64. JS5 stated that while progress had been made in addressing climate change, women remained disproportionately affected due to persistent gender inequalities and structural barriers. Despite their crucial role in food production, rural women faced limited access to climate information and climate smart solutions. Moreover, their dependence on biomass (firewood and charcoal) for cooking had contributed to environmental degradation and had posed serious health and safety risks.⁸⁸

2. Rights of specific persons or groups

Women

65. JS5 referred to relevant supported recommendations from the previous review and stated that despite notable progress in promoting gender equality and empowerment of women, persistent barriers had remained, including limited access to credit, the underrepresentation of women in local governance, systemic labour market inequalities, and the burden of unpaid care and domestic work.⁸⁹

66. Noting relevant supported recommendations from the previous review, JS5 stated that despite, commendable efforts, access to gender-based violence services had remained limited. There were also barriers to justice for victims, resulting in a reliance on informal dispute resolution mechanisms which prioritized reconciliation over accountability.⁹⁰

67. JS2 stated that the Law on Prevention and Punishment of Cybercrimes (Law 60 of 2018), which aimed to address some forms of technology-facilitated gender-based violence, had fallen short of implementation and that there were concerns that this Law was being misused to criminalize survivors where content was created and shared without their consent.⁹¹

Children

68. Noting the prevalence of violence against children, child labour and child trafficking, JS7 stated that the child protection system, was severely underfunded, lacked a unified data management system, and faced challenges in maintaining a professional workforce.⁹²

69. CUI referred to a relevant supported recommendation from the previous review and commended Rwanda for the dedicated budget allocations and programmes targeting the most vulnerable children. However, it expressed concern about some areas being chronically under resourced, including relating to foster care and mental health.⁹³

70. JS7 stated that in some contexts, children had experienced a climate of fear when engaging in legitimate questioning, nuanced discussions, or exploration of sensitive historical or political topics, which stifled the development of critical thinking skills, discouraged open debate, and inhibited the formation of independent political opinions, all of which were crucial for healthy civic identity formation and meaningful democratic participation.⁹⁴

71. Noting the implementation of campaigns to remove children from the streets and place them in transit centres, CUI expressed concern that the transit centres often lacked long-term follow-up or reintegration plans and that children frequently returned to the streets.⁹⁵

Persons with disabilities

72. JS11 stated that persons with disabilities had continued to face poverty, low income, illiteracy, unemployment and a lack of reasonable accommodation. The disability policy had remained unimplemented, and policymaking and programme implementation had been hindered by the absence of reliable disaggregated data. The disability mainstreaming guidelines had often not been considered or applied by Government institutions during planning processes.⁹⁶

Indigenous Peoples and minorities

73. HCDO stated that the classification of the Batwa as historically marginalized peoples by Rwanda had denied the Batwa of its recognition as indigenous peoples. Consequently, the Batwa remained marginalized, discriminated against, and were not represented in decision-making bodies. Education had remained inaccessible to many children due to the inability to pay school fees and other related costs, which contributed to the cycle of intergenerational poverty. The Batwa had also faced barriers to accessing health care which had led to higher infant mortality rates, higher incidence of disease and malnutrition, and lower expectancy.⁹⁷

74. HCDO stated that the Batwa had been displaced from their ancestral lands due to conservations initiatives and Agri-livestock programmes, which had destroyed their way of life and resulted in the gradual disappearance of their rich culture and traditions that were linked to their forest-way of life.⁹⁸

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons

75. JS10 noted concerns about laws, policies and practices that negatively impacted LGBTIQ+ persons. The absence of explicit legal protection based on sexual orientation and gender identity left LGBTIQ+ persons vulnerable to discrimination and violence without room for them to confidently seek justice.⁹⁹ JS8 stated that the legal framework did not recognize non-binary gender identities and did not provide for sex reassignment.¹⁰⁰

76. JS2 stated that although same-sex relations were not criminalized, Rwandan society was conservative and online and offline attacks based on gender identity and sexual orientation were prevalent.¹⁰¹ JS8 expressed concern about allegations of acts which violated the mental and physical integrity of LGBTI persons, including physical assaults, insults and sexual violence.¹⁰² YDHRA stated that religious institutions were central actors in perpetuating stigma and discrimination against LGBTIQ+ persons.¹⁰³

Migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers

77. JAI stated that Rwanda had established a reputation for embracing refugees and asylum seekers and expressed concern that the country's policies might be subjected to exploitation by third-party States seeking to avoid their own obligations under applicable international law, including international refugee law.¹⁰⁴

78. JS11 raised concern about the lack of legal aid for immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and the absence of translators at all borders and airports. Also, many immigration officials and judicial authorities lacked sufficient knowledge of international refugee law and relevant domestic law.¹⁰⁵

Internally displaced persons

79. ACHPR took positive note of the recognition of the legal status of displaced persons and their families, as well as the inclusion of the issue of statelessness in the national population and housing census.¹⁰⁶

Stateless persons

80. ACHPR stated that Rwanda had established an effective and efficient document registration system, which included the registration of births.¹⁰⁷

Notes

¹ A/HRC/47/14, A/HRC/47/14/Add.1, and A/HRC/47/2.

² The stakeholders listed below have contributed information for this summary; the full texts of all original submissions are available at: www.ohchr.org (one asterisk denotes a national human rights institution with A status).

*Civil society**Individual submissions:*

BC	Broken Chalk, Amsterdam (The Netherlands);
CPJ	Committee to Protect Journalists, New York (United States of America);
CUI	Coalition Umwana ku Isonga, Kigali (Rwanda);
ECLJ	European Centre for Law and Justice, Strasbourg (France);
ERF	Elizka Relief Foundation (Ghana);
FLD	Frontline Defenders, Dublin (Ireland);
HCDO	Hope for Community Development Organization (Rwanda);
HDI	Health Development Initiative, Kigali (Rwanda);
HRF	Human Rights Foundation, New York (United States of America);
HRW	Human Rights Watch, Geneva (Switzerland);
IBAHRI	International Bar Association Human Rights Institute, London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);
ICAN	International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Geneva (Switzerland);
JAI	Just Atonement Inc., New York (United States of America);
OIAD	International Observatory of Lawyers in Danger, Paris (France);
UFR	Unite for Rights, San Francisco (United States of America);
WEA	World Evangelical Alliance, Geneva (Switzerland); and
YDHRA	Youth for Development and Human Rights Advancement (Rwanda).

Joint submissions:

JS1	African Association of Jehovah's Witnesses and The European Association of Jehovah's Witnesses (Germany) (Joint Submission 1);
JS2	Association for Progressive Communications, Johannesburg (South Africa) and the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (Joint Submission 2);
JS3	The Center for Reproductive Rights, the Health Development Initiative, the Great Lakes Initiative for Human Rights and Development, and the Rwanda NGOs Forum on HIV/AIDS and Health Promotion (Joint Submission 3);
JS4	CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, Johannesburg (South Africa) and Centre for Minority Rights Development (Joint Submission 4);
JS5	HAGURUKA, Rwanda Women Network, Réseau des Femmes Oeuvrant pour le Développement Rural, Empower Rwanda, Save Generations Organization, Duhozanye, AKWOS, Pro-Femmes Twese Hamwe, Family Magazine, Rwanda Girls Guides, Rwanda National Association of Deaf Women, SEVOTA, Hope for Single Mothers with Disabilities, Réseau de Développement des Femmes Pauvre, UNABU, and Girls Leaders Forum Rwanda (Joint Submission 5);
JS6	The East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project and Observatoire des Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda (Joint Submission 6);
JS7	Marist International Solidarity Foundation, Marist Brothers – Province of Central-West Africa, and Solidaridad, Educación, Desarrollo (Joint Submission 7);
JS8	Health Development Initiative, Rwanda Men's Resource Centre, African Youth and Adolescent Network, Amahoro Human Respect Organisation, Feminist Action Development Ambition, Hope and Care, My Rights Alliance, Thriving for Inclusive Community Organization, Wiceceka Christian Support Organization, Kigali (Rwanda) (Joint Submission 8);
JS9	A Never Again Rwanda, Kigali (Rwanda) and Citizen Rights and Development (Joint Submission 9);
JS10	Pan Africa ILGA, Johannesburg (South Africa) and Federatie van Nederlandse Verenigingen tot Integratie van Homoseksualiteit (Joint Submission 10);

- JS11 Center for Human Rights and Development, Fight Illiteracy Youth Organisation, Strive Foundation Rwanda, Rwanda NGO Forum on HIV/AIDS, National Union of Disability Organisations of Rwanda, Faith Victory Association, Hope for Community Development Organisation, Ihorere Munyarwanda Organisation, Legal Aid Forum Secretariat and some members comprising: Association des Jeunes Avocats du Rwanda, Action pour le Développement du Peuple, Association Rwandaise pour la Défense des Droits de la Personne et des Libertés Publiques, Association de la Jeunesse pour la Promotion des Droits de l'Homme et du développement, Association Rwandaise pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme, Communauté des Potiers du Rwanda, Human Rights First Rwanda Association, Ligue Rwandaise pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits de l'Homme, The Network of Lawyers of Hope Rwanda, Mouvement des Peuples pour l'Education aux Droits Humains, Non Crime Rwanda, UMUSANZU, IMPAMO, IMANZI, RUGALI, AMAHORO Newspaper, PAX PRESS and Media Press House Kigali, (Rwanda) (Joint Submission 11);
- JS12 Small Media Foundation, The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa, ARTICLE 19, and University of Birmingham (Joint Submission 12); and
- JS13 Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa, Kampala (Uganda) and The Pan African Lawyers Union (Joint Submission 13).

National human rights institution:

NCHR National Commission for Human Rights.

Regional intergovernmental organization:

ACHPR African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights.

³ NCHR, paras. 9–11 and 17.

⁴ Ibid., paras. 18 and 19. NCHR made a recommendation (para. 20).

⁵ Ibid., para. 15. NCHR made a recommendation (paras. 16, 28 and 29).

⁶ Ibid., paras. 32 and 33. NCHR made a recommendation (para. 34).

⁷ Ibid., para. 26. NCHR made a recommendation (para. 27).

⁸ The following abbreviations are used in UPR documents:

ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
OP-ICESCR	Optional Protocol to ICESCR
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICCPR-OP 1	Optional Protocol to ICCPR
ICCPR-OP 2	Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
OP-CEDAW	Optional Protocol to CEDAW
CAT	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
OP-CAT	Optional Protocol to CAT
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
OP-CRC-AC	Optional Protocol to CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict
OP-CRC-SC	Optional Protocol to CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography
OP-CRC-IC	Optional Protocol to CRC on a communications procedure
ICRMW	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
OP-CRPD	Optional Protocol to CRPD
ICPPED	International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance

- ⁹ ERF, p. 1. ERF made recommendations (p. 6). See also HRW, para. 24. HRW made a recommendation (p. 9).
- ¹⁰ ICAN, p. 1.
- ¹¹ UFR, p. 3. UFR made recommendations (p. 3).
- ¹² JS2, para. 14. JS2 made recommendations (p. 8). See also CPJ, para. 9. CPJ made a recommendation (para. 30).
- ¹³ JS10, para. 34.
- ¹⁴ JS2, para. 7.
- ¹⁵ JS11, p. 4. JS11 made recommendations (p. 4).
- ¹⁶ HRF, paras. 28 and 29.
- ¹⁷ JS11, p. 5. JS11 made recommendations (p. 6).
- ¹⁸ JS8, p. 3. JS8 made recommendations (p. 7).
- ¹⁹ HRW, paras. 25 and 26, referring to A/HRC/47/14, para. 135.33(United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), para. 135.34(Romania), para. 135.35(Spain), para. 135.36(Sweden), para. 135.37(United States of America), para. 135.44(Ireland), para. 135.45(Austria), para. 136.20(Switzerland), and para. 136.23(Norway). A/HRC/47/14/Add.1. See also JAI, paras. 4 and 7.
- ²⁰ JS11, p. 15.
- ²¹ HRF, paras. 22–26.
- ²² HRW, para. 29. HRW made recommendations (pp. 8–9).
- ²³ ERF, p. 1. ERF made a recommendation (p. 6).
- ²⁴ ERF, p. 1. ERF made a recommendation (p. 6). See also JS11, p. 14. JS11 made recommendations (p. 14).
- ²⁵ HRW, para. 33. HRW made recommendations (p. 9).
- ²⁶ Ibid., para. 34. HRW made recommendations (p. 9). See also JAI, para. 6.
- ²⁷ Ibid., para. 35. HRW made recommendations (p. 9).
- ²⁸ JAI, para. 17. JAI made recommendations (para. 20).
- ²⁹ OIAD, paras. 6 and 7. OIAD made recommendations (p. 4).
- ³⁰ HRW, para. 9.
- ³¹ OIAD, paras. 14–16. OIAD made recommendations (p. 4).
- ³² Ibid., paras. 10, 17, 19, 20 and 25. OIAD made recommendations (pp. 4 and 6).
- ³³ HRW, para. 30. HRW made recommendations (pp. 8–9).
- ³⁴ JS11, p. 15.
- ³⁵ JS10, paras. 37 and 39. JS10 made recommendations (para. 53).
- ³⁶ JS11, p. 6. JS11 made a recommendation (p. 7).
- ³⁷ ECLJ, paras. 5, 6, 8 and 13. ECLJ made a recommendation (para. 14) See also ERF, pp. 2–3.
- ³⁸ WEA, paras. 8 and 13. WEA made recommendations (paras. 27–29).
- ³⁹ JS1, paras. 1–7 and para. 15. JS1 made recommendations (para. 20). ECLJ, para. 8.
- ⁴⁰ WEA, para. 22.
- ⁴¹ FLD, para. 8.
- ⁴² JS6, para. 4.2 and 5.2. JS6 made recommendations (para. 6.3). JS13, para. 19. See also JS12, para. 25. JS12 made recommendations (p. 23); ERF, p. 3; FLD, para. 13; HRF, paras. 14 and 18. HRF made recommendations (para. 31); JS13, paras. 8, 9, 11, 14 and 15. JS13 made recommendations (p. 8); CPJ, paras. 11–21.; and JAI, para. 4. JAI made recommendations (para. 18).
- ⁴³ JS12, para. 23. JS12 made recommendations (p. 23). See also HRF, para. 19. HRF made recommendations (para. 31).
- ⁴⁴ HRW, para. 8, referring to A/HRC/47/14, para. 134.49(Costa Rica), para. 134.50(Czechia), para. 134.51(Barbados), para. 134.52(Ghana), para. 134.53(Italy), para. 134.54(Latvia), para. 134.55(Lithuania), para. 134.56(Maldives), para. 134.57(Republic of Korea), para. 134.58(Romania), para. 134.59(Sudan), para. 134.60(Sweden), para. 134.61(Switzerland), and para.134.62(United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).
- ⁴⁵ JS6, para. 4.1. JS6 made recommendations (para. 6.3). JS12, para. 6.
- ⁴⁶ JS2, para. 8, referring to A/HRC/47/14, para.134.50 (Czechia), para. 134.53 (Italy), para. 134.55 (Lithuania), para. 134.57 (Republic of Korea), and para. 134.58 (Romania). JS2 made recommendations (p. 7). See also JS9, para. 3.10.
- ⁴⁷ JS4, paras. 4.3 and 4.4. JS4 made recommendations (para. 6.5). JS9, para. 3.6. JS9 made recommendations (para. 4.4). JS12, para. 14. JS12 made recommendations (p. 22). See also JS6, paras. 4.4 and 4.5. JS6 made recommendations (para. 6.3); and HRW, paras. 16–20. HRW made recommendations (p. 6).
- ⁴⁸ JS12, para. 28.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., para. 34.
- ⁵⁰ JS6, para. 4.3. JS6 made recommendations (para. 6.3).
- ⁵¹ The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 2003, Revised in 2015.

- ⁵² JS4, paras. 2.2, 2.8, 2.9, 2.12. JS4 made recommendations (para. 6.3). YDHRA, para. 12. YDHRA made a recommendation (p. 9). See also JS9, paras. 2.4–2.6, 2.8–2.12. JS9 made recommendations (para. 4.3); JS10, paras. 43 and 45. JS10 made recommendations (para. 54); JS11, p. 13. JS11 made a recommendation (p. 13); FLD, paras. 19 and 21; and JAI, para. 8. JAI made recommendations (para. 18).
- ⁵³ JS6, paras. 2.2–2.6, JS6 made recommendations (para. 6.1).
- ⁵⁴ JS4, para. 3.3. JS4 made recommendations (para. 6.4).
- ⁵⁵ FLD, paras. 9, 14 and 25. FLD made recommendations (p. 6).
- ⁵⁶ JS9, paras. 4.1 and 4.2 and Annex. JS9 made recommendations (paras. 4.3 and 4.4).
- ⁵⁷ JS6, paras. 2.8–2.10. See also ERF, p. 4. ERF made a recommendation (p. 6).
- ⁵⁸ HRW, para. 10. HRW made recommendations (p. 6).
- ⁵⁹ HRF, para. 12. HRF made recommendations (para. 31). See also HRW, para. 11 and JAI, para. 10. JAI made recommendations (para. 18).
- ⁶⁰ JS12, para. 38 and 39. JS13, paras. 17 and 18.
- ⁶¹ JS2, paras. 3 and 5. See also JS4, para. 4.8.
- ⁶² JS12, paras. 57 and 58, referring to A/HRC/47/14, para.134.62 (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). JS12 made a recommendation (p. 23). See also JS13, para. 12. JS13 made a recommendation (p. 8).
- ⁶³ JS13, paras. 2 and 21. JS13 made a recommendation (p. 8). See also JS12, para. 43.
- ⁶⁴ JS2, para. 16. JS2 made recommendations (p. 8).
- ⁶⁵ HRF, para. 27. JS2, para. 17. JS2 made recommendations (p. 8). See also JS12, para. 52.
- ⁶⁶ IBAHRI, paras. 4 and 14. IBAHRI made recommendations (paras. 20–25). See also CUI, paras. 16 and 17.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, paras. 5 and 6.
- ⁶⁸ JS11, p. 11. See also CUI, para. 10.
- ⁶⁹ IBAHRI, para. 9. See also paras. 4 and 7.
- ⁷⁰ JS7, para. 27. JS7 made recommendations (para. 29).
- ⁷¹ JS11, p. 12.
- ⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 9. JS11 made a recommendation (p. 9).
- ⁷³ ACHPR, p. 1.
- ⁷⁴ JS3, paras. 7–11, referring to A/HRC/47/14, para. 134.89 (Bahamas) and para. 134.93 (Burkina Faso). JS3 made recommendation (pp. 11–12).
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, paras. 29 and 37, referring to A/HRC/47/14, para. 136.60 (Denmark) and para. 136.61 (Uruguay). JS3 made recommendation (pp. 11–12). See also JS11, p. 10.
- ⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, paras. 16, 17, 21 and 26, referring to A/HRC/47/14, para. 134.87 (Uruguay), para. 134.90 (France), para. 134.92 (Iceland) and para. 134.144 (Islamic Republic of Iran). JS3 made recommendations (pp. 11–12). See also JS5, paras. 16 and 17.
- ⁷⁷ JS7, para. 32. See also JS11, p. 6. JS11 made a recommendation (p. 7).
- ⁷⁸ JS3, paras. 39, 40 and 45. JS3 made a recommendation (p. 12).
- ⁷⁹ HDI, paras. 16 and 17.
- ⁸⁰ CUI, para. 21.
- ⁸¹ JS7, para. 20. JS7 made a recommendation (para. 22). See also BC, para. 29. BC made a recommendation (para. 45).
- ⁸² ERF, pp. 4–5.
- ⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.
- ⁸⁴ JS7, para. 27. JS7 made recommendations (para. 29).
- ⁸⁵ BC, para. 37. BC made recommendations (para. 47).
- ⁸⁶ JS7, paras. 32 and 33.
- ⁸⁷ CUI, paras. 12 and 13, referring to A/HRC/47/14, para. 134.25 (Fiji).
- ⁸⁸ JS5, paras. 19–21. JS5 made recommendations (pp. 4–5).
- ⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, paras. 1–8, referring to A/HRC/47/14, para. 134.21 (Argentina), para. 134.22 (Armenia), para. 134.109 (Ethiopia), para. 134.110 (Kenya), para. 134.111 (Kenya), para. 134.112 (Myanmar), para. 134.116 (Singapore), para. 134.117 (Cameroon), para. 134.118 (Tunisia), para. 134.120 (Azerbaijan) and para. 134.121 (Chile). JS5 made recommendations (pp. 4–5). See also JAI, para. 11.
- ⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 9–14, referring to A/HRC/47/14, para. 134.121 (Chile), para. 134.122 (Croatia), para. 134.123 (Djibouti), para. 134.124 (Finland), para. 134.125 (Georgia), para. 134.126 (Iceland), para. 134.127 (India), para. 134.128 (Iraq), para. 134.129 (Botswana), para. 134.130 (Lesotho), para. 134.131 (Lithuania), para. 134.132 (Namibia), para. 134.133 (Nepal), para. 134.134 (Norway), para. 134.135 (Republic of Korea), para. 134.136 (Sierra Leone), para. 134.137 (Sweden), para. 134.138 (Ukraine), para. 134.139 (Zambia), and para. 134.140 (Morocco). JS5 made recommendations (pp. 4–5). See also JS11, para. 5; ERF, p. 5 and JAI, para. 12. JAI made recommendations (para. 21).
- ⁹¹ JS2, para. 19. JS2 made recommendations (p. 9).

- ⁹² JS7, para. 32.
- ⁹³ CUI, paras. 23 and 24, referring to A/HRC/47/14, para. 134.141 (Barbados).
- ⁹⁴ JS7, para. 32.
- ⁹⁵ CUI, paras. 26–28.
- ⁹⁶ JS11, p. 8. JS11 made recommendations (p. 8). See also ERF, p. 2.
- ⁹⁷ HCDO, pp. 1–6. HCBO made recommendations (pp. 7–8).
- ⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. 6–7. HCBO made recommendations (pp. 7–8).
- ⁹⁹ JS10, paras. 14, 18, and 21. See also YDHRA, para. 8. YDHRA made a recommendation (p. 9).
- ¹⁰⁰ JS8, p. 4. See also JS10, para. 25. JS10 made recommendations (para. 51).
- ¹⁰¹ JS2, para. 22.
- ¹⁰² JS8, p. 4.
- ¹⁰³ YDHRA, para. 24.
- ¹⁰⁴ JAI, para. 14.
- ¹⁰⁵ JS11, para. 9. JS11 made recommendations (p. 9).
- ¹⁰⁶ ACHPR, p. 5.
- ¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 5.
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