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Summary prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (c) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 and paragraph 5 of the annex to Council resolution 16/21

Syrian Arab Republic*

The present report is a summary of 26 stakeholders' submissions¹ to the universal periodic review. It follows the general guidelines adopted by the Human Rights Council in its decision 17/119. It does not contain any opinions, views or suggestions on the part of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), nor any judgement or determination in relation to specific claims. The information included herein has been systematically referenced in endnotes and, to the extent possible, the original texts have not been altered. As provided for in Human Rights Council resolution 16/21, where appropriate, a separate section is provided for contributions by the national human rights institution of the State under review that is accredited in full compliance with the Paris Principles. The full texts of all submissions received are available on the OHCHR website. The report has been prepared taking into consideration the periodicity of the review and developments during that period.

* The present document was not edited before being sent to United Nations translation services.



Information provided by stakeholders

A. Background and framework

1. Scope of international obligations²

1. Alkarama, HRG, JS1, JS3, JS5, JS6, JS11, JS14, Maratous and SL4C recommended that the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR) become a party to the ICPPED.³
2. Alkarama, HRG, JS1, JS5, JS6, JS8, JS14, Maratous and SL4C recommended that SAR become a party to the OP-CAT.⁴
3. Alkarama, HRG, JS1, JS6 and JS14 recommended that SAR ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC.⁵
4. Alkarama and JS6 recommended that SAR become a party to Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.⁶
5. Alkarama and JS3 recommended that SAR ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.⁷ Alkarama recommended that SAR ratify the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.⁸

2. Constitutional and legislative framework

6. JS6 noted that the new Constitution, adopted in 2012, had left certain provisions untouched, including articles that undermined the independence of the judiciary (133 and 141) and make it quasi impossible to hold the President accountable for acts committed during his term (article 117).⁹ JS3 recommended that SAR review its national legislation, including the constitutional amendments of 2012 and ensure the effective independence of judges, lawyers and the judicial authorities from the executive.¹⁰
7. JS1, JS3, JS5, JS6 and SL4C recommended that SAR include enforced disappearances in the Penal Code.¹¹
8. JS14 recommended enacting a clear definition of torture in Syrian law, consistent with CAT.¹² AUA, JS1 and SL4C made similar recommendations.¹³
9. JS12 and JS7 recommended that SAR adopt legislation criminalizing marital rape.¹⁴ JS7 recommended amending the Penal Law, repealing the provision allowing for mitigated sentences for rapists who marry their victims.¹⁵ JS12 recommended amending Article 548 of the Criminal Code which provides for reduced sentences in cases of “honour crimes”.¹⁶ JS4 and Maratous recommended adopting a law to protect women from domestic violence.¹⁷

3. Institutional and human rights infrastructure and policy measures

10. JS6 indicated that the specialised bodies created to investigate or address widespread human rights abuses and violence such as the Independent Special Legal Commission and the Minister of State for National Reconciliation Affairs did not conduct their work in a transparent and independent manner. It observed that their activities had focused significantly on missing persons and prisoner exchanges, noting that families reported having paid large amounts of money to obtain a relative’s release.¹⁸
11. JS6 recommended that SAR: establish a national independent commission of inquiry, composed of international and Syrian figures to document war crimes, serious violations of human rights law, and crimes against humanity committed by all parties to the conflict (PtC) in SAR; create a national reparations programme; fight corruption within its institutions.¹⁹

B. Cooperation with human rights mechanisms

12. JS6 noted that SAR had failed to implement accepted recommendations²⁰ during the first review to cooperate with the Independent International Commission of Inquiry and allow it to access its territory.²¹ Alkarama, JS4, JS5, JS6, JS8 and SL4C recommended that SAR allow the Commission of Inquiry to access its territory.²²

Cooperation with special procedures

13. HRG, JS6 and JS8 recommended that SAR extend a standing invitation to the Special Procedures.²³ Alkarama noted that in violation of commitments made during the first UPR²⁴, SAR had not accepted all pending requests for country visits.²⁵ HRG, JS1, JS5, JS6 and SL4C recommended issuing an invitation to the Special Rapporteur on Torture.²⁶ RWB/RSF recommended allowing the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to inspect detention centers.²⁷ HRG recommended allowing a visit of the Working Group on Enforced Disappearances.²⁸

14. Alkarama recommended that SAR implement without delay the recommendations of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention's Opinions.²⁹

C. Implementation of international human rights obligations, taking into account applicable international humanitarian law

1. Equality and non-discrimination

15. JS14 reported that the Citizenship Law No. 276 (1969) prevented women from granting citizenship to their children.³⁰ JS10 noted that due to the violent nature of the conflict, tens of thousands of fathers were absent, including those who were deceased, fighting, missing, imprisoned and displaced, making it extremely difficult to establish a child's legal link to a Syrian father, heightening the risk of statelessness. The forced displacement of a huge proportion of the population amplified and transferred across borders the risks of statelessness.³¹ JS1 and JS14 recommended that SAR amend the law to ensure women's right to grant citizenship to their children.³²

16. JS14 indicated that the Personal Status Law provided that in the absence of the father, guardianship was exercised by a child's grandfather and uncles, making it impossible for a Syrian woman to obtain travel documents for her children.³³ JS14 recommended that SAR amend the Personal Status Law to allow Syrian women to have guardianship of their children.³⁴ JS7 recommended the amendment of the provisions in the Personal Status Law that discriminate against women, specifically in the areas of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and marital property.³⁵

2. Right to life, liberty and security of the person

17. HRW reported that the Government and its allies had carried out deliberate and indiscriminate attacks on civilians.³⁶ Seven submissions made similar observations.³⁷

18. According to Alkarama, in several attacks, the authorities had made use of barrel bombs, cluster munitions, as well as weapons whose effects are of an indiscriminate nature.³⁸

19. Alkarama observed that the use of chemical weapons had been documented, noting that SAR was party to the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons since 2013.³⁹ JS6 and JS3 made related observations.⁴⁰ HRW reported that all declared chemical weapons had been removed from Syria for destruction in 2014 according to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. However, evidence strongly

suggested that the Government had dropped barrel bombs embedded with cylinders of chlorine gas in northern SAR in April 2015.⁴¹

20. HRW recommended that SAR: abide by the laws of war, especially by immediately ending all deliberate, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks against civilians; cease all use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas; investigate alleged violations of the laws of war and other abuses and discipline or prosecute as appropriate members of the state security forces responsible.⁴² Alkarama, JS3, JS6, JS11 made related recommendations.⁴³ JS3 recommended that Syria abide by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 2118 and 2209; and that an independent international committee be allowed to investigate the use of chemical weapons.⁴⁴

21. JS3 noted that the majority of airstrikes carried out were on civilian regions under the control of the armed opposition and recommended commitment to resolution 2139.⁴⁵

22. JS7 stated that SAR had witnessed deliberate military attacks on hospitals and health facilities, targeting of medical personnel and transport, imprisonment of medical professionals, restrictions on aid delivery, and attacks on humanitarian convoys.⁴⁶ Alkarama noted that hospitals and health facilities under the control of opposition forces had systematically been the object of attacks by governmental forces.⁴⁷ Alkarama, JS4 and JS13 recommended that SAR put an end to the attacks targeting hospitals and health facilities.⁴⁸

23. JS7 stated that ISIL and other non-state armed groups also targeted health infrastructure and limited civilians' healthcare access. Blockades and checkpoints, as well as fighting, prevented transport of necessary medical supplies.⁴⁹

24. JS6 highlighted the deliberate targeting of civilian facilities such as bakeries, schools, places of worship, monuments and archaeological sites.⁵⁰

25. JS1 stated that hunger had been used as a weapon of war.⁵¹ Alkarama noted that the Government had continuously imposed sieges, and that despite their commitments made during the first UPR,⁵² had continued to prevent the passage of humanitarian aid.⁵³ HRW reported that the UN estimated that 400,000 Syrians were living in areas under siege, while the Siege Watch project put that number at over one million people, for whom access to international assistance was deliberately and systematically withheld as a method of warfare and the movement of civilians was greatly restricted.⁵⁴ JS11 observed that the Government did not provide essential and indispensable food and medical supplies to besieged areas, although it was capable of providing them aerially.⁵⁵

26. JS11 noted that Government affiliated PtC had restricted the passing of vital foodstuffs to civilians in need.⁵⁶ JS9 reported that the systematic imposition of sieges by PtC had violated the people's rights to basic services to meet their daily needs.⁵⁷

27. JS6 recommended that SAR: implement all relevant UNSC resolutions, particularly those relating to humanitarian aid; immediately lift the blockade on all besieged areas and facilitate the arrival of unrestricted humanitarian aid and assistance, in particular to the areas most affected by the conflict.⁵⁸ Nine other submissions made related recommendations.⁵⁹

28. HRW stated that non-state armed groups opposing the government had carried out serious abuses including attacking civilians, using child soldiers, kidnapping, and torture.⁶⁰ JS11 indicated that opposition PtC used abduction and arrest policies in areas under their control, either for financial reasons, for prisoner exchanges or to tighten their control and suppress opposition.⁶¹

29. JS2 stated that all PtC were implicated in war crimes and crimes against humanity, noting that IS in particular was alleged to have committed acts of genocide against the Yazidi community.⁶² GJC reported that "Daesh" had singled out the Yazidi minority, most

notably Yazidi women and children, for especially brutal treatment.⁶³ JC reported that ISIL had repeatedly sexually abused Christian and Yazidi women and girls causing both bodily and mental harm.⁶⁴ ADF International indicated that as a result of the extermination campaign against Christians and Yazidis, their population had dramatically decreased by way of both forced migration and killings.⁶⁵

30. ADF International recommended that SAR investigate and prosecute all acts of genocide.⁶⁶ JS2 noted that debate continued regarding whether genocide had also been committed against Christians and other religious minorities and ethnic groups and indicated an urgent investigation was warranted to determine whether genocide was being committed against such groups.⁶⁷

31. Alkarama noted that the death penalty was foreseen for many criminal offences and was particularly concerned that numerous death sentences were handed down by the Anti-Terrorism Court and military courts following heavily flawed trials.⁶⁸

32. ADF International reported that the death penalty was imposed by extremist groups as a punishment for offences such as failing to convert or failing to adhere to their interpretation of sharia law, in breach of international law.⁶⁹

33. JS3 stated that despite accepted recommendations⁷⁰ during the first UPR cycle, Government forces continued to carry out arbitrary arrests and unlawful detentions. Detainees were tortured to confess to crimes they did not commit and were not allowed to contact a lawyer.⁷¹

34. Alkarama also noted that during the first UPR, the authorities had affirmed that recommendations calling for an end to torture were “already implemented”⁷² or “in the process of being implemented”.⁷³ However, this practice remained systematic in all detention centres controlled by the Government and its allied forces.⁷⁴

35. HRW stated that Syrian security forces continued to detain people arbitrarily, regularly subjecting them to ill-treatment and torture.⁷⁵ SL4C stated that all social categories and both men and women had been tortured.⁷⁶ JS3 reported that many children had been arrested and tortured.⁷⁷

36. Alkarama recommended that SAR: put an end to the systematic practice of torture; and allow access to appropriate medical care to all torture victims and detainees; and put an end to the impunity of the members of the security services.⁷⁸ GJC recommended that SAR cease acts of torture and inhuman treatment including sexual violence.⁷⁹

37. Alkarama also noted that although during the previous review the recommendation⁸⁰ on enforced disappearances had been rejected on the grounds that it was “based on incorrect assumptions”, enforced disappearances had become a widespread and systematic practice since the beginning of the conflict.⁸¹

38. HRW indicated that detainees were often forcibly disappeared, using an extensive network of detention facilities throughout SAR, noting estimates that some 85,000 people were being held by the Government in conditions that amounted to enforced disappearance.⁸² SL4C indicated that all security forces and branches of the Government had practiced the policy of enforced disappearances.⁸³ JS11 stated that the Government practiced policies of abduction, arrests, and forced disappearances, especially of journalists, activists calling for reform and/or opposing the Regime, clerics, and human rights defenders.⁸⁴

39. JS4 noted reports of the use of detainees for bargaining purposes in detainee swaps, or as hostages to pressure their relatives to hand themselves in.⁸⁵ HRW and JS1 made related observations.⁸⁶

40. Alkarama recommended that SAR: put an end to the systematic practice of enforced disappearances, open and conduct prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into all cases of disappearances and inform the victims' families about the fate of their missing relatives; and effectively collaborate with the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances.⁸⁷ Eight other submissions made related recommendations.⁸⁸ JS1 recommended providing compensation to victims and ensuring accountability of those responsible for disappearances.⁸⁹
41. FLD called on the Syrian authorities as well as all other PtC to release all human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists, protesters and other activists arbitrarily detained for their peaceful and legitimate work.⁹⁰
42. HRW urged SAR to regularly publish official lists of all individuals currently in Syrian detention centres.⁹¹ HRG, JS3, JS4, JS6, JS11, and JS14, made related recommendations.⁹² JS5 and JS1 recommended that SAR reveal the location of secret detention facilities.⁹³
43. HRW also urged the government of SAR to regularly publish official lists of all detainees who died in Government detention facilities and prisons and issue death certificates for detainees known to have died in custody based on thorough forensic examinations.⁹⁴ HRG, JS1, JS14, Maratous and SL4C, recommended that SAR establish a DNA database for the families of the missing.⁹⁵ JS1 recommended that SAR disclose the location of mass graves.⁹⁶ JS11, JS14, HRG, and Maratous, made similar recommendations.⁹⁷
44. According to JS6, with the surge in the number of detainees, the authorities at the very least accepted the deteriorating detention conditions. Overcrowding, malnourishment, lack of access to healthcare and sanitation had become commonplace. Numerous deaths due to starvation and illness had been documented.⁹⁸
45. JS3 recommended that SAR allow international monitors to have unconditional access to all detention centres and prisons in SAR, including unofficial prisons which are run by government security forces.⁹⁹ HRW, JS1, JS5, JS6, JS8 and Maratous made related recommendations.¹⁰⁰
46. JS6 recommended that SAR take measures to end overcrowding in all places where State actors hold detainees and ensure that persons detained are held in appropriate facilities and conditions, in accordance with international standards.¹⁰¹ JS5 recommended that SAR improve the living conditions of detainees including with regard to food, health-care and sanitation.¹⁰²
47. JS7 reported that Government forces and other armed groups had used rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war throughout the conflict.¹⁰³
48. GJC reported that the Syrian Government and government-controlled militia (Shabbiha) had used sexual violence against women during house searches and at checkpoints; against men and women in detention centres; and as a way to coerce male relatives fighting with anti-Government armed groups to surrender.¹⁰⁴
49. JS4 reported that the Government deliberately arrested women, knowing that in a patriarchal society that confines honour to the bodies of women this would bring shame on the entire family.¹⁰⁵ JS7 observed that upon release, women were often alienated from their families and viewed as "unfit" for marriage, and in some instances divorced or killed, because family members believed they had been raped.¹⁰⁶
50. JS11 indicated that PtC used rape as a means of pressure and punishment, and as a weapon to propagate terror and fear.¹⁰⁷ GJC stated that "Daesh" not only targeted women,

but also operated a regime based on the subjugation of, and discrimination against women.¹⁰⁸

51. JS3 recommended that SAR investigate all those accused of rape and hold them accountable for their crimes.¹⁰⁹ JS4 recommended that SAR establish shelters for abused women and those rejected by their families.¹¹⁰ GJC recommended that SAR provide redress to victims including access to appropriate, non-discriminatory medical care.¹¹¹

52. JS4 noted that human trafficking crimes had increased since the start of the armed conflict and recommended that SAR issue the implementation instructions relative to the human trafficking law.¹¹²

53. JS3 noted that Government forces had used 15 years-old as guards and in surveillance operations and recommended that the Government immediately stop recruiting children in military operations.¹¹³ JS12 stated that some opposition PtC recruited male children who were used in dangerous military and criminal operations.¹¹⁴

54. GIEACPC hoped that a recommendation would be made that SAR clearly prohibit corporal punishment of children in all settings.¹¹⁵

3. Administration of justice, including impunity, and the rule of law

55. Alkarama stated that despite commitments undertaken during the first cycle,¹¹⁶ fundamental fair trial guarantees had never been respected by the judicial authorities.¹¹⁷ JS6 reported that legal provisions and practices that prevent immediate access to legal counsel or that allow for confessions extracted under torture to be used as evidence in court remained both within the ordinary court system as well as in specialised courts.¹¹⁸ JS5 recommended that SAR ensure that detainees were accorded all fundamental legal safeguards from the outset of detention.¹¹⁹

56. SL4C observed that though the State Security Court had been dissolved, exceptional courts continued to exist and that such courts lacked the minimum guarantees for a fair trial.¹²⁰ Alkarama noted two types of special courts existed: military courts, which had jurisdiction to try civilians, and the Anti-Terrorism Court and that both courts systematically violated fair trial guarantees.¹²¹

57. JS5 and JS6 expressed concern regarding military field courts, JS6 noting that their legal basis was Decree No. 109 (1968), which did not provide for the possibility to appeal and exempted judges and military personnel from respecting procedural rights. It was estimated that the courts treated the cases of some 40,000 individuals, half of whom were being considered in absentia. Many of the defendants were civilians. These courts' proceedings were characterised by their extreme secrecy and the fact that many defendants were sentenced to death in a blatant breach of their right to life.¹²² The relevant recommendations¹²³ from the previous UPR had therefore not been implemented.¹²⁴ JS8 noted that there was no public record of these Military Field Courts' sessions, obscuring the true scale of executions sanctioned through these processes.¹²⁵

58. Alkarama noted the adoption of the Anti-Terrorism Law through Legislative Decree no. 19 (2012), which formally abolished the state of emergency and was followed by Legislative Decree no. 22 (2012) establishing the Anti-Terrorism Court.¹²⁶ It was reported that the Anti-Terrorism Law was used against political opponents, human rights activists, aid workers and common citizens. Particular concern was expressed at the fact that this legislation provided for the death penalty for many offences, including non-violent ones.¹²⁷ JS8, JS6 and FLD made related observations.¹²⁸ Alkarama and AUA recommended that SAR repeal the Anti-Terrorism law.¹²⁹

59. JS6 noted that Decree No. 22 (2012), establishing the Anti-Terrorism Court, included a provision exempting the court from respecting the procedural rights of defendants.¹³⁰

60. Alkarama, JS5, JS6, JS13, JS14, Maratous, and SL4C recommended that SAR abolish exceptional jurisdictions.¹³¹ JS6 recommended that SAR: respect its obligation under common Article 3(d) of the Geneva Conventions relative to the prohibition of sentencing to, and implementation of executions without a trial before a regularly constituted court.¹³² FLD called on the authorities as well as all other PtC to cease the use of special courts to prosecute human rights defenders.¹³³

61. JS6 noted that the Military Procedure Law and the State Security Management Act remained in force and that accordingly, no member of the armed forces or the security services could be prosecuted without the authorisation of the Minister of Defence or the Director of the State Security Department, respectively. In addition, Legislative Decrees 14/1969 and 69/2008 granted immunity to members of the security forces for acts committed while on duty.¹³⁴ JS6 observed that these laws remained in force although SAR had accepted a recommendation to “[r]eform the legal system so as to entrench accountability of the military and the security apparatus”.¹³⁵

62. JS14 recommended that SAR repeal Decrees 14/1969 and 69/2008 that give immunity to members of the security forces and police.¹³⁶ Six other submissions made similar recommendations.¹³⁷

4. Right to privacy, marriage and family life

63. JS7 reported that Syrian law required women to have the permission of their male guardian to marry. Men may marry at 18 but women could marry at 17 and moreover, judges had the discretion to authorise marriage for boys as young as 15 and girls as young as 13.¹³⁸ JS12 noted that early marriages had increased during the civil war out of fear of widespread sexual assaults and due to economic hardship.¹³⁹ JS7 noted that a 2013 study found that women in SAR were increasingly forced into marriage after rape to avoid honour killings.¹⁴⁰ JS12 observed that marriages outside the official courts had increased during the civil war, especially in the religious courts of PtC. This had led to many women giving birth at a young age, and the deterioration of their health.¹⁴¹

64. JS12 stated that SAR must: define the minimum age of marriage, care for married minors and their children, and guarantee their well-being and health¹⁴²; appropriately penalize marriage outside of specialized courts, and bring to justice those responsible for marrying minors.¹⁴³

65. JS12 recommended that SAR amend article 520 of the Criminal Code to guarantee the decriminalization of sexual relations between people of the same sex.¹⁴⁴

5. Freedom of movement

66. JS3 indicated that institutions in SAR had prevented residents and political activists from having passports or even renewing their old ones.¹⁴⁵ JS1 recommended the lifting of travelling bans on bloggers, journalists, civil society activists, and political opponents.¹⁴⁶

67. JS12 recommended that SAR respect the freedom of movement of civilians, and end intelligence procedures and group punishments carried out in and around roadblocks and checkpoints.¹⁴⁷

68. JS12 recommended that PtC end military and security roadblocks restricting movement by civilians, exposing them to detention and arrest while passing.¹⁴⁸

6. Freedom of religion or belief, expression, association and peaceful assembly, and right to participate in public and political life

69. ADF International reported that religious minorities in SAR faced persecution because of their religion or belief.¹⁴⁹ Religious and minority groups were specifically targeted by “Daesh”, Jabhat al-Nusra and other extremist groups. Many were targeted because of being Christian.¹⁵⁰ ADF International recommended that SAR investigate and prosecute: unlawful killings, executions and persecution of, and discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities.¹⁵¹

70. FLD indicated that human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists and academics had been subjected to arbitrary arrest, incommunicado and secret detention, ill-treatment, torture, enforced disappearance, unfair trials and killings for carrying out their peaceful human rights work. They had been a direct target of government forces, pro-government militias and non-state armed groups.¹⁵²

71. RWB/RSF stated that SAR has been the world’s deadliest country for journalists for the past four years. Since the start of the conflict in 2011, at least 50 journalists and 142 citizen-journalists had been killed covering the conflict. At least 25 professional and non-professional journalists were being held by the authorities and around 30 journalists were either missing or held hostage by armed groups.¹⁵³

72. RWB/RSF reported that opposition groups were also responsible for abducting or threatening journalists and had developed a full-blown “hostage-industry”, especially prizing foreign journalists.¹⁵⁴

73. HRW urged the Government to release all individuals deprived of their liberty for peacefully exercising their rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly.¹⁵⁵ RWB/RSF recommended that SAR systematically and transparently investigate attacks against journalists; and ensure that those responsible for violence against journalists were held to account.¹⁵⁶ FLD called on Syrian authorities and all other parties to the conflict to stop targeting human rights defenders and ensure that they are able to carry out their legitimate activities.¹⁵⁷

74. JS8 was concerned with the effect of the campaign of violence on freedom of expression with widespread self-censorship, closure of most independent news sources and propaganda designed to advance the causes of the government and armed groups.¹⁵⁸

75. FLD indicated that the authorities used several provisions in the Penal Code to silence critics.¹⁵⁹ JS1 recommended developing a new law on freedom of the press which would repeal the penalties on defamation and libel.¹⁶⁰

76. JS14 stated that newspapers and printed and audio-visual media were strictly controlled by the security forces and no neutral or opposition media was permitted.¹⁶¹ RWB/RSF recommended that SAR end censorship and ensure respect for media freedom and independence.¹⁶²

77. JS8 noted that rules governing the creation and operation of associations in SAR were codified in Law 93 (1958). The law granted full authority to the Government to decide if an association could be registered, and allowed it to deregister an organisation. In practice, the Government had used the wide discretion granted by the law to deny Syrian citizens the right to freedom of association.¹⁶³

78. JS8 stated that the right to freedom of peaceful assembly was all but completely denied. Activists described conditions of enormous fear, in which no public gatherings, of even two or three people, was tolerated. People attempting to gather publicly risked immediate arrest and disappearance at the hands of security forces.¹⁶⁴

79. JS6 recommended that SAR abolish law No. 93 and draft a law that ensures freedom of association and peaceful assembly in accordance with international standards.¹⁶⁵

80. JS3 observed that parliamentary elections would be conducted in 2016 highlighting that this election would take place amid the absence of the majority of the Syrian people.¹⁶⁶

81. JS12 reported that less than 12 percent of representatives in parliament were women and that opposition PtC forbade any political activity in opposition to their political cause, and deprived women from participating in local councils.¹⁶⁷

7. Right to work and to just and favourable conditions of work

82. JS12 reported that PtC forced civilians, prisoners, and detainees to perform hard labour for long hours and sometimes near-continuously, leading to deaths among prisoners and detainees, especially in absence of any health care.¹⁶⁸

8. Right to social security and to an adequate standard of living

83. JS9 indicated that the war had exacted serious economic harm on the people, specifically on vulnerable and marginalized groups, with a notable increase in the Syrian population living under the poverty line, from one third before the conflict to around half at the end of 2013. The war had affected 50 percent of the total housing stock already by May 2014. The crisis had reversed Syria's human development achievements by 35 years.¹⁶⁹

84. JS9 noted that five years of armed conflict had destroyed much of the country's agricultural infrastructure, displaced food producers and disrupted regional trade of food and agricultural inputs and food availability.¹⁷⁰ According to JS13, a study carried out in 2015 indicated that 1 out of 3 persons were unable to access basic food needs.¹⁷¹ The continuous shelling of markets, bakeries, and agricultural infra-structure had been a constant threat to the food security and livelihood. The decrease in crops reached 75% due to shelling agricultural lands by Syrian government forces.¹⁷²

9. Right to health

85. JS13 noted reports that the systematic targeting to health facilities and staff in SAR had caused a large number of doctors to flee.¹⁷³ JS13 indicated that only 45% of the total health staff before the conflict still worked in SAR. Lack of basic services, potable water and basic sanitation had led to an increase in epidemics.¹⁷⁴ JS4 made related observations indicating that the Government was responsible for the spread of diseases due to the blockage of vaccines and medicines and the inability of women and children to access basic medical services.¹⁷⁵ JS4 also reported that the lack of food and medical care had negatively affected the health of those pregnant and breastfeeding, and led to higher infant mortality rates.¹⁷⁶

86. JS7 noted that women and girls had been forced to carry pregnancies resulting from rape to term either because it was too dangerous to travel or because they were denied abortion or contraceptive services.¹⁷⁷ GJC reported that SAR had restrictive laws on abortion and only permitted abortion to save a woman's life.¹⁷⁸ As a result of the rampant sexual violence committed by all PtC, there was a need to ensure that non-discriminatory medical care was available to victims, including access to safe abortion and other sexual and reproductive health services.¹⁷⁹

10. Right to education

87. JS7 observed that prior to the conflict, primary school enrolment had been nearly universal and literacy rates high. Currently, SAR was estimated to have one of the lowest

school enrolments in the world. An estimated half of all Syrian refugee children were receiving no education, and in some neighbouring countries, the figure was worse.¹⁸⁰

88. JS3 indicated that nearly two million children inside SAR were deprived of their right to education due to the armed conflict. Thousands of residents stopped sending their children to school since Government forces deliberately targeted schools and educational facilities.¹⁸¹ JS3 recommended that SAR stop targeting schools and educational facilities.¹⁸²

11. Minorities and indigenous peoples

89. AUA stated that the situation of Assyrian Christians remained precarious and that the rate of emigration indicated that many Assyrian Christians had decided to leave the country.¹⁸³

90. Maratous indicated that despite a new law granting citizenship to Kurds, it did not cover all cases.¹⁸⁴ JS1 recommended that SAR reinstate their nationality.¹⁸⁵

12. Migrants, refugees and asylum seekers

91. JS9 reported that the situation of 581,000 Palestinian refugees in SAR had become catastrophic as the civil war had caused a grave deterioration of living conditions. Almost half of the Palestinian refugees had been displaced either internally or outside the country.¹⁸⁶ JS12 indicated that the Government had enacted a long siege on some Palestinian camps.¹⁸⁷

13. Internally displaced persons

92. JS1 stated that the extreme use of force resulted in the displacement of 7.6 million Syrians and had turned another 4.6 million into refugees. The Government had also systematically displaced civilians in order to create demographic changes in some areas through the confiscation and destruction of properties and villages.¹⁸⁸

93. JS12 stated that PtC had set out to evict civilians living in areas under their control for religious, nationalist or sectarian reasons, or due to the perceived political inclinations of residents.¹⁸⁹

94. JS9 reported that “Islamic State” and al-Nusra Front militiamen were accused of confiscating houses and land in al-Raqq`a, Dheir al-Zor and Idlib provinces belonging mostly to Christians families, distributing most of them amongst themselves.¹⁹⁰ Additionally, the Assyrian and Armenian communities had accused the Democratic Union Party of expropriating private property in the al-Ḥasaka province.¹⁹¹

95. JS9 recommended that all PtC end the policy and practice of population transfer for the purpose of acquiring land and altering the demographic composition of the territory under their control.¹⁹² JS1 recommended that SAR establish a mechanism to facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons to their regions of residence, and restore their property under the supervision of the United Nations.¹⁹³

Notes

¹ The stakeholders listed below have contributed information for this summary; the full texts of all original submissions are available at: www.ohchr.org.

Civil society

Individual submissions

ADF International	ADF International, Geneva, (Switzerland);
Alkarama	Alkarama Foundation, Geneva, (Switzerland);
AUA	Assyrian Universal Alliance - in consultation with the Assyrian Human Rights Network (AHRN) and the Assyrian Democratic Organization (ADO)Americas Chapter , Hammurabi Human Rights Organization (HHRO);
FLD	Front Line Defenders – The International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, Dublin (Ireland);
GIEACPC	Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, London, (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);
GJC	Global Justice Center, New York (United States of America);
HRG	Human Rights Guardians, Antakia (Turkey);
HRW	Human Rights Watch, Geneva (Switzerland);
JC	Jubilee Campaign, Fairfax, VA, (USA);
Maratous	Maratous, Damascus (Syrian Arab Republic);
RWB/RSF	Reporters Without Borders, Paris, (France);
SL4C	Syrian league for citizenship, Beirut, (Lebanon).

Joint submissions:

JS1	Joint submission 1 submitted by: Syrian Feminist Lobby , Syrian Network for Human Right, Free Syrian Lawyers Association, Musawa, Women’s Studies Center, Mussawa Organization, Maratous for Citizenship & Human Rights , Human Rights Guardians , Amal Women Center. Supported by: EFI – IFI – Geneva institute for Human Rights (GIHR), Rdfi (Rassemblement democratique des femmes libanaises) Broumana, (Lebanon);
JS2	Joint submission 2 submitted by: Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) and Syrian Christians for Peace, New Malden, (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);
JS3	Joint submission 3 submitted by: Syrian Network for Human Rights, Syrian Human Rights League and the Syrian Center for Legal Studies and Research, (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);
JS4	Joint submission 4 submitted by: Badael, BIHAR Relief Organization, Center for Civil Society and Democracy (CCSD), Dawlaty, Musawa - Women's Study Center, Syrian Female Journalists Network, Syrian League for Citizenship, Syrian Women's League, Women Now, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Geneva (Switzerland);
JS5	Joint submission 5 submitted by: Syrian Detainees Coalition for UPR_Syria, حماة حقوق الشبكة السورية لحقوق الإنسان منظمة صوت المعتقلين, مركز الأمل للتعاافي والمناصرة الإنسان Damascus (Syrian Arab Republic);
JS6	Joint submission 6 submitted by: EuroMed Rights (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights network - EMHRN), Syrian Center for Legal research and Studies (SCLRS), Syrian Center for Statistics and research (SRC), Syrian Institute for Justice (JUSTICE -SIJ), Syrian League for Citizenship (SL4C), Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), The Day After (TDA), Urnammu, Violations Documentation Center in Syria (VDC), Copenhagen, (Denmark);

- JS7 Joint submission 7 submitted by: MADRE, New York (United States of America), Human Rights and Gender Justice (HRGJ) Clinic, City University of New York School of Law Long Island City, New York (United States of America) and The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) Geneva, (Switzerland);
- JS8 Joint submission 8 submitted by: CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation and the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM), Johannesburg, (South Africa);
- JS9 Joint submission 9 submitted by: Habitat International Coalition's Housing and Land Rights Network (HIC-HLRN), Giza, (Egypt), Santiago, Chile and FIAN International Heidelberg (Germany), Geneva, (Switzerland);
- JS10 Joint submission 10 submitted by: The Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion and The Global Campaign for Equal Nationality Rights (the Global Campaign), Eindhoven, (Netherlands);
- JS11 Joint submission 11 submitted by: Nuon Organization for Peace building (NUON); MARATOUS for citizenship and human rights (MARATOUS); Dawlaty Association (DAWLATI);; Enssan center for documenting human rights violation (ENSAN); Center for civil society and democracy in Syria (CCSDS); Violations Documentation Center (VDC); jabhat nusra violation;; Palestinian human rights organization (PHRO), Beirut, (Lebanon);
- JS12 Joint submission 12 submitted by: المنظمة الفلسطينية لحقوق الإنسان ، مركز التنمية الانسانية، جمعية النجدة الإجتماعية، المساعدات الشعبية (حقوق) ، لجنة عمل اللاجئين الفلسطينيين (نوع) لبنان، جمعية عمل تنموي بلا حدود –الزويجية ، المؤسسة R-CEP مركز تعزيز العمل والحماية الإجتماعية CEP في لبنان ، جمعية المرأة الخيرية، مركز حقوق اللاجئين (شاهد) الفلسطينية لحقوق الإنسان ، جمعية البرامج النسائية، جمعية مساواة، مجمع الكنائس للخدمة الإجتماعية(عائدون) . Palestinian Human Rights Organization (PHRO), Dawlaty Association (DAWLATI); Lamsat Ward Association; Syrian Network for Human rights (SN4HR); Nuon Organization for Peace building (NUON); Komîtên Bihara Kurdî liSûriyê; Amals Healing and Advocacy Center; Human Rights Guardians (HRG); The Palestinian League for Human Rights-Syria (PAHR-S); Beirut, (Lebanon);
- JS13 Joint submission 13 submitted by: Coalition of NGOs for UPR-Syria (SFL) Bihar Relief Organization/ جمعية بهار الإغاثية /, Ghiras Foundation/ منظمة شفق /Shafak organization/ مؤسسة غراس /, Syrian institute for justice/ المعهد السوري للعدالة /, Syria Relief Network/ شبكة إغاثة سوريا /, Gaziantep (Türkiye);
- JS14 Joint submission 14 submitted by: Alkawakibi Organisation, Human Rights Guardians, Start Point, the Free Syria Lawyers Association and No Peace Without Justice, Rome (Italy).

² The following abbreviations are used in UPR documents:

ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
OP-ICESCR	Optional Protocol to ICESCR
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICCPR-OP 1	Optional Protocol to ICCPR
ICCPR-OP 2	Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
OP-CEDAW	Optional Protocol to CEDAW

CAT	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
OP-CAT	Optional Protocol to CAT
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
OP-CRC-AC	Optional Protocol to CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict
OP-CRC-SC	Optional Protocol to CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography
OP-CRC-IC	Optional Protocol to CRC on a communications procedure
ICRMW	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
OP-CRPD	Optional Protocol to CRPD
ICPPED	International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

- ³ Alkarama, paras. 8 and 10, HRG, p. 5, JS1, p. 9, JS3, p.5, JS5, p. 3, JS6, para.7, JS11, p.8, JS14, p. 15, Maratous, p. 3, SL4C, p.4.
- ⁴ Alkarama, paras. 8 and 10. 7, HRG, p. 7, JS1, p.8, JS5, p.6, JS6, para. 7, JS8, p.13, JS14, p. 13, Maratous, p. 3, SL4C, p.2.
- ⁵ Alkarama, paras. 9-10, HRG, p.5, JS1, p.3. JS6, para.7. JS6, para.7, and JS14, p.15.
- ⁶ Alkarama, paras. 9-10, JS6, para.7.
- ⁷ Alkarama, paras. 9-10 and JS3, p.3.
- ⁸ Alkarama, paras. 9-10.
- ⁹ JS6, paras. 8-10.
- ¹⁰ JS3, p.8.
- ¹¹ JS1, p.9, JS3, p.5, JS5, p. 4, JS6, para.43, SL4C, p.4.
- ¹² JS14, p. 13.
- ¹³ AUA , para.3, JS1, p.8, SL4C, p.2.
- ¹⁴ JS7, para. 35, JS12, p.8.
- ¹⁵ JS7, para. 34.
- ¹⁶ JS12, p. 9. See also JS7, para. 36.
- ¹⁷ JS4, p.6, Maratous, p. 5. See also JS12, p.8.
- ¹⁸ JS6, paras. 15-16.
- ¹⁹ JS6 para. 18.
- ²⁰ For the full text of the recommendations see A/HRC/19/11, paras. 103.11 (United Kingdom), 103.12 (Brazil), 103.13 (Slovenia), 103.14 (Switzerland), 103.15 (Thailand), 103.16 (Norway), 103.17 (Chile), 103.18 (Maldives), 103.19 (Republic of Korea), 103.20 (Germany).
- ²¹ JS6, para. 19.
- ²² Alkarama, para. 18, JS4, p. 17. JS5, p. 4, JS6, para. 22, JS8, para. 15, SL4C, p.4.
- ²³ HRG, p. 8, JS6, para. 22, JS8, p.16.
- ²⁴ For the full text of the recommendations see A/HRC/19/1, paras. 103.24 (Slovenia) and 103.25 (Belgium).
- ²⁵ Alkarama, para. 16.
- ²⁶ HRG, p. 8, JS1, p.8, JS5, p. 7, JS6, para. 22, SL4C, p.2.
- ²⁷ RWB/RSF, p.3.
- ²⁸ HRG, p. 5
- ²⁹ Alkarama, para. 18.
- ³⁰ JS14, p.8.
- ³¹ JS10, para. 18. See also JS7, paras.25-26.
- ³² JS1, p.5, JS14, p.9.
- ³³ JS14, p.7. See also JS4, p.15.
- ³⁴ JS4, p.8.
- ³⁵ JS7, para. 44.
- ³⁶ HRW, p.1.
- ³⁷ Alkarama, para. 19, JS1, p.1, JS4, pp.10-11, JS6, paras. 25- 26, JS8, p. 5 , JS11, p.4, Maratous, p. 5.
- ³⁸ Alkarama, para. 19. See also JS1, p.1, JS3, p.2, JS6, para. 25 and JS11, pp.4-5.

- ³⁹ Alkarama, para. 19.
⁴⁰ JS3, p.3, JS6, para.24.
⁴¹ HRW, p.2.
⁴² HRW, p.2.
⁴³ Alkarama, para. 22, JS3, p.4, JS6, para. 27, JS11, pp. 9-10.
⁴⁴ JS3, p. 4. See also JS6, para. 27.
⁴⁵ JS3, p.3.
⁴⁶ JS7, para.18. See also GJC, para. 19.
⁴⁷ Alkarama, para.20. See also JS13, p.2.
⁴⁸ Alkarama, para. 22, JS4, p.19, JS13, p.7.
⁴⁹ JS7, para. 19.
⁵⁰ JS6, para.26.
⁵¹ JS1, p. 2.
⁵² For the full text of the recommendations see A/HRC/19/11, paras. 100.26 (Malaysia), 100.27 (Thailand), 101.5 (Poland).
⁵³ Alkarama, para.21. See also JS3, p.3 and JS6, paras. 28-30.
⁵⁴ HRW, p. 4.
⁵⁵ JS11, p.6.
⁵⁶ JS11, p.5.
⁵⁷ JS9, p.5.
⁵⁸ JS6, para. 31.
⁵⁹ Alkarama, para. 22, GJC, para.31, HRW, p.4, JS1, p.3, JS3, p.4, JS4, p.13, JS9.p.9, JS11, pp. 10-11, JS13, p.7.
⁶⁰ HRW, p.1.
⁶¹ JS11, p.3.
⁶² JS2, para.16.
⁶³ GJC, para. 15.
⁶⁴ JC, p.2.
⁶⁵ ADF, para.33.
⁶⁶ ADF, para. 35. See also GJC, para.18 and JC, p.3.
⁶⁷ JS2, paras.16-17.
⁶⁸ Alkarama, para.23.
⁶⁹ ADF, para.7.
⁷⁰ For the full text of the recommendations see A/HRC/19/1, paras:
101.10(Spain) 101.11(Norway), 101.12(Poland), 101.13 (Switzerland), 101.14(Uruguay),
101.15(Sweden), 101.16(Chile), 101.17(Spain), 01-18(Poland).
⁷¹ JS3, p.4.
⁷² For the full text of the recommendation see A/HRC/19/11, para. 101.9 (Sweden).
⁷³ For the full text of the recommendation see A/HRC/19/1, para. 102.3 (Norway).
⁷⁴ Alkarama, para. 26. See also JS3, p. 5.
⁷⁵ HRW, p.2. See also JS8, pp.6-7.
⁷⁶ SL4C, p.1.
⁷⁷ JS3, p. 6.
⁷⁸ Alkarama, para.29. See also AUA, para.3 and FLD, para.29.
⁷⁹ GJC, para. 29.
⁸⁰ For the full text of the recommendations see A/HRC/19/11, para. 105.9 (Czech Republic).
⁸¹ Alkarama, para.39.
⁸² HRW, p.2.
⁸³ SL4C, p.4.
⁸⁴ JS11, p.3.
⁸⁵ JS4, p.7.
⁸⁶ HRW, p.2 and JS1. p.7.
⁸⁷ Alkarama, para.42.
⁸⁸ HRW, p.3, JS1, p.9, JS3, p.5, JS4, p. 8, JS5, p. 3- 4, JS6, para.43, JS14, p.15, SL4C, pp.3-4.
⁸⁹ JS1, p.9.
⁹⁰ FLD, para.29. See also JS6, para.57 and RWB/RSF, p.3.

- ⁹¹ HRW, p.2.
⁹² HRG, p.5, JS3, p.5, JS4, p. 8, JS6, para. 43, JS11, p.9, JS14, p.15.
⁹³ JS5, p. 4, 5, JS1, p.8.
⁹⁴ HRW, p.2. See also JS1, p.9, JS4, p.8 and JS8, p.13.
⁹⁵ HRG, p.5 JS1, p.9, JS14, p.15. Maratous, p. 6, SL4C, p.4.
⁹⁶ JS1, p.9
⁹⁷ JS11, p. 9, JS14, p.15. HRG, p. 3-4, Maratous, p. 6.
⁹⁸ JS6, para.34. See also Alkarama, para. 27 and SL4C, p. 2.
⁹⁹ JS3, p.5.
¹⁰⁰ HRW, p.3, JS1, p.8, JS5, p. 5, JS6, para.40, JS8, p.13, Maratous, p. 5.
¹⁰¹ JS6, para. 40. See also Alkarama, para.29.
¹⁰² JS5, p. 5-6.
¹⁰³ JS7, para.6 See also JS1, p.7, JS3, p.7, JS4, p.5.
¹⁰⁴ GJC, para.8.
¹⁰⁵ JS4, p.7.
¹⁰⁶ JS7, para. 7. See also JS6, para. 38 and GJC, para.10.
¹⁰⁷ JS11, p.7. See also JS7, para.8.
¹⁰⁸ GJC, para.4.
¹⁰⁹ JS3, p.7.
¹¹⁰ JS4, p. 8.
¹¹¹ GJC, para.27.
¹¹² JS4, pp 5-.6.
¹¹³ JS3, p.6.
¹¹⁴ JS12, p. 3.
¹¹⁵ GIEACPC, para.1.3.
¹¹⁶ For the full text of the recommendations see A/HRC/19/11, paras. 101.17 (Spain), 101.18 (Poland), 101.19 (Switzerland), 101.20 (Belgium).
¹¹⁷ Alkarama, para.35.
¹¹⁸ JS6, para.44.
¹¹⁹ JS5, p. 10.
¹²⁰ SL4C, pp.2-3.
¹²¹ Alkarama, para.37. See also See also FLD, para.8, JS1, p.5, JS5, p. 8.
¹²² JS6, para.47 and JS5, p. 8-9. See also JS1, p.5.
¹²³ For the full text of the recommendations see A/HRC/19/11, paras. 102.7 (Switzerland); 102.12 (Netherlands).
¹²⁴ JS6, para.48.
¹²⁵ JS8, p. 7.
¹²⁶ Alkarama, para.12.
¹²⁷ Alkarama, para.44.
¹²⁸ JS8, p.9-10, JS6, para.46 and FLD, para.10.
¹²⁹ Alkarama, para.46 and AUA, para.3.
¹³⁰ JS6, para.45.
¹³¹ Alkarama, para.38, JS5, p. 10, JS6, para.50, JS13, p.7, JS14, p.10. Maratous, p. 7 and SL4C, p.3.
¹³² JS6, para.50.
¹³³ FLD, para.29.
¹³⁴ JS6, para. 11.
¹³⁵ JS6, para. 11. See also JS1, p.5, JS3, p.2, JS12, p.12, SL4C, pp.1,2 and 4. For the full text of the recommendation see A/HRC/19/11, para. 102.12 (Netherlands) SL4C, p.2.
¹³⁶ JS14, p.10.
¹³⁷ JS1, p.6, JS3, p.6, JS4, p.13, JS5, p. 8, JS13, p.6, SL4C, p.2 and 4.
¹³⁸ JS7, para. 14.
¹³⁹ JS12, p. 5-6.
¹⁴⁰ JS7, para. 15.
¹⁴¹ JS12, p. 6.
¹⁴² JS12, p. 9.
¹⁴³ JS12, p. 9.

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- 144 JS12, p. 8.
145 JS3, p.6.
146 JS1, p.10. See also JS4, p.10.
147 JS12, p.11.
148 JS12, p.10.
149 ADF, para.18.
150 ADF, para.8. See also JS2, para. 23.
151 ADF, para.35.
152 FLD, para.5. See also JS8, p.8.
153 RWB/RSF, p.1. See also JS3, p.3 and JS8, p.8.
154 RWB/RSF, p.2.
155 HRW, p.3.
156 RWB/RSF, p.3.
157 FLD, para.29.
158 JS8, p.10.
159 FLD, para.9.
160 JS1, p.10.
161 JS14, p.5.
162 RWB/RSF, p.3.
163 JS8, p.4. See also FLD, para.4.
164 JS8, p.11.
165 JS6, para.57. See also JS8, p.12.
166 JS3, p.7.
167 JS12, p. 10.
168 JS12, p. 2.
169 JS9, p.2.
170 JS9, p.7.
171 JS13, p.3.
172 JS13, p.4.
173 JS13, p.2.
174 JS13, p.3.
175 JS4, p.18.
176 JS4, p.17.
177 JS7, para.9.
178 GJC, para. 21.
179 GJC, para. 20.
180 JS7, paras. 29-30.
181 JS3, p.6. See also JS4, p. 20.
182 JS3, p.6.
183 AUA, para.5.
184 Maratous, p. 7.
185 JS1, p.4. See also JS14, p.9.
186 JS9, p.4.
187 JS12, p.4.
188 JS1, p.2.
189 JS12, p. 2.
190 JS9, p.3.
191 JS9, p.4.
192 JS9, p.9. See also JS3, p.3 and JS12, p.6.
193 JS1, p.3.
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