



**Joint Submission
for the
Universal Periodic Review of Lebanon
Third Cycle Review**

**Situation of Economic and Social Rights in Lebanon
by**

**Arab NGO Network for Development
Lebanon Support
Housing and Land Rights Network
Lebanese Observatory for Workers and Employees Rights**

A. General Background and Framework

1. Lebanon's third-cycle UPR takes place amid a massive wave of unprecedented nationwide protests that started on 17 October 2019. These protests are motivated by the direct repercussions of the economic and monetary crisis on the Lebanese population, whose grievances are rooted in economic and social rights violations inherent in a structurally flawed economic and political system of sectarianism and corruption embraced by decades of successive governments since Lebanon's independence.ⁱ
2. The protracted crisis in Lebanon has deep roots. Over the three decades of the enabling Washington Consensus, sectarian and political allies since the coincident Taif Agreement ending the Lebanese Civil War have had their respective private banks charging five to ten times the prevailing world interest rate on Lebanese government bonds. Today's result is the state's indebtedness to the domestic banking sector running almost double the country's income.
3. After thirty years of borrowing to finance reconstruction after the internationalized Civil War, Lebanon now lacks a sufficient potable water supply, public transport, electricity grid and solid waste management. The state lacks key institutions such as a ministry for housing and corresponding policy, while maintaining irrational and opaque governance structures in the municipal sphere. Jobs are scarce, and emigration and other manifestations of despair run high, all this while facing the additional human-displacement challenges associated with another uprising transformed into yet another internationalized civil war in next-door Syria since 2011.
4. The prevailing policy of fighting inflation with a deficit-ridden capital account has further dollarized the economy, squandered much of the national wealth and resources, and brought the share of the wage bill from national income from about 50 percent in the late nineties to twenty five percent in 2015.
5. With the livelihoods of the average Lebanese household is in peril from diminishing wages, skyrocketing costs and inadequate social protection, remorseless Lebanese banks also have put themselves at risk by lending at larcenous rates that brought the economy to a virtual standstill. Consequently, with the country's productive capacity dangerously low and national debt ranked as the world's third highest, the formula of sectarianism also has stripped the people of Lebanon from meaningful citizenship to which they are entitled, leaving them instead to appeal for favors from their respective sectarian patrons, who, in turn, consistently rely on the state to sustain them. However, the state has failed to ensure development, and to respond effectively to Lebanese people demand transition from a rentier economy to a productive economy and a nationally owned rights-based sustainable development strategy. Furthermore, the protracted crisis in Lebanon has become deeper and even more complex with the global COVID-19 pandemic
6. This joint submission prepared by the Arab NGO Network for Developmentⁱⁱ, XXXX, XXXXX focuses on economic and social rights conditions in Lebanon from 2016 to date and assesses the implementation of the recommendations received during the second UPR cycle.

B. Scope of International Obligations

7. During the second UPR cycle, Lebanon 'noted' all recommendations with regard to strengthening the normative framework for the promotion and protection of human rights in the country. However, no such progress was made.

We urge the Human Rights Council and the Working Group to call upon Lebanon's government to:

8. Intensify cooperation with the international human rights system by ratifying the ICESCR Optional Protocol, the Migrant Workers Convention, Convention on the Rights

of Persons with Disabilities and ILO Conventions Nos. 169, 87 and 189, and withdrawing its reservations to CEDaW.

9. Ensure that all domestic laws conform to international human rights standards.

C. Institutional and Human Rights Infrastructure

10. Lebanon established the National Human Rights Commission, which includes the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, under Presidential Decrees No. 3267 (19 June 2018) and No. 5147 (5 July 2019).

11. During its second UPR, Lebanon noted also the recommendation to establish a monitoring mechanism to prevent abuse, guarantee decent working conditions and wages. Although no such monitoring mechanism was established, the 2017 reactivation of the Economic and Social Council was considered a positive step. However, the current and previous Council of Ministers (CoM) excluded that Council from economic and social policy formulation at a time when such involvement is needed more than ever.

We urge the Human Rights Council and the Working Group to call upon Lebanon's government to:

12. Provide the National Human Rights Commission with sufficient resources to carry out its mandate effectively and independently, including the promotion and protection of economic, social and cultural rights, and to act as a bridge between government and civil society to empower individuals to claim their economic and social rights and encourage their participation in policy making.

13. Ensure that the Economic and Social Council plays a pro-active role in economic and social policy making, given its central role in facilitating social dialogue and ensuring multi-stakeholder participation.

D. Implementation of International Human Rights Obligations, Taking into Account Applicable International Humanitarian Law

a. State obligation to use maximum available resources

14. During Lebanon's 2nd UPR, the only recommendation related to allocation of resources related to education, calling on Lebanon to "ensure equitable and sustainable resources to education," which Lebanon supported. However, with a high percentage of the budget spent on public debt service,ⁱⁱⁱ clearly Lebanon does not allocate its resources effectively to implement ICESCR Article 2(1).

15. Adopted by late January 2020, the budget further decreased social spending, threatening the most vulnerable in Lebanese society and causing retrogression in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. This included a 8% decrease in aggregate social spending compared to 2019,^{iv} including a 7% decrease in healthcare expenditure, 7% decrease in education expenditure, 88% decrease in housing expenditure, 33% decrease for environment conservation, including administrative and research costs and waste management; a 2% cut in social protection disbursements and 3% decrease for the National Social Security Fund.

16. After its sovereign-debt default in March 2020, the Lebanese government announced its plan to seek International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance to deal with the macroeconomic finance crisis. At the time of this submission, the government was still negotiating with IMF for a potential 3 to 5 billion USD intervention, given Lebanon's share in the fund. At best, this loan may contribute to solving the financial crisis temporarily, but, in reality, will perpetuate the borrowing policy adopted over 30 years and increase the share of external debt, which is associated with economic conditionality.

17. Tax policies implemented in Lebanon should be assessed to ensure 'maximum available resources' standard and that government put implement policies to collect sufficient

resources to achieve the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights. However, within the Lebanese tax system, taxes (and exemptions) favor rentier activities, while penalizing productive ones, favoring informal labor relations rather than formal ones and, finally, favoring capital over labor. Tax regulations continue to be unfair, relying heavily on indirect taxation through the Value-added Tax (VAT) on consumption, which disproportionately impacts the poor. ^v

We urge the Human Rights Council and the Working Group to call upon Lebanon’s government to:

18. Reverse recent cuts in social spending and avoid any social-spending cuts, enable and publicize a priori assessments to document that all measures are necessary, proportionate, and compliant with minimum core obligations.

19. Fulfill its ICESCR obligations in negotiations with the IMF and put into place a clear legal and institutional framework to ensure transparency and accountability in loan negotiation and debt management. ^{vi}

20. Reform Lebanon’s tax system with the aim of achieving fair redistribution of income and wealth, ensuring the collection of all due taxes, and encouraging productive economic sectors. This includes introducing a global income tax, imposing tax on the profits of holding companies, restructuring income brackets, removing unjustified tax exemptions, in addition to introducing a progressive tax on rentier income, including profits from sale of capital assets (such as real estate) and interests from bank accounts.

21. Reform taxes on consumption, replacing the uniform VAT rate with different scales according to products, whereby basic food products would be taxed less than other products; and remove the exemption on luxury items to tax them at higher rates.

b. Adequate Standard of Living

22. The 2nd UPR was weak on poverty, focusing only on the implementation of programs to support the poorest with the 2011 launch of the National Poverty Targeting Program (NPTP). Nevertheless, this program’s outcomes are limited, as it does not consider poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon, but rather addresses poverty merely targeting certain segments of the society.

23. Despite the paucity of data, it is clear that the poverty rate in Lebanon has been increasing. The World Bank’s 2018 estimates put the poverty rate at around 33%, up from 27.4% in 2011–2012. ^{vii} However, the surge seems to have occurred after 2018. In its “Financial Recovery Plan,” adopted on 30 April 2020, the Lebanese government cited the World Bank, revealing the poverty rate had already reached 48% and “may well exceed 60%” by the end of 2020. ^{viii}

24. The increase in poverty and the decrease in the general standard of living have been partially caused by the depreciation of the national currency, which has plummeted to the lowest exchange rates ever recorded in Lebanon. This loss in value is primarily caused by a shortage in foreign currency liquidity in the Lebanese economy, caused by a deep imbalance in the current-account deficit. However, the arbitrary and illegal capital control measures and withdrawal restrictions imposed by the banks since fall 2019, as well as the policies of the central bank in response to the crisis, have exacerbated the depreciation.

25. By mid-June 2020, the real rate of exchange in the informal market was 5,000 LBP for every U.S. dollar, more than three times the official rate of 1,500. This depreciation and the scarcity of dollars has hit the country’s producers, importers and consumers alike, especially as the country relies on imports for a wide range of essential products. The central bank has subsidized the import of fuel, wheat and medicine, while other imported goods have risen dramatically in price, which meant a severe blow to purchasing power.

26. The government’s Financial Recovery Plan (2020) reflects a narrow approach in tackling poverty, one that primarily revolves around a social safety net program funded by international financial institutions and consisting of cash transfers to the “poorest families.”

Evidence from the region demonstrate that these programs have only reached 40% of the poor population^{ix}, which means that, assuming a poverty rate of 60% at the beginning of 2021, 24% of Lebanon's population might be facing poverty without of any assistance.

We urge the Human Rights Council and the Working Group to call upon Lebanon's government to:

27. Adopt a new and comprehensive approach to poverty reduction that includes fiscal and monetary policies that protect and enhance purchasing power, enhances productive sectors for employment generation, redistributes concentrated income and wealth, as well as establishes affordable public transportation and a universal social-protection system.

c. The Human Right to Adequate Housing

28. Whereas Lebanon's 2nd UPR referred to the human right to adequate housing only within the context of a general economic and social rights recommendation^x that Lebanon supported, it is a key right as "a precondition for the enjoyment of several human rights, including the rights to work, health, social security, vote, privacy or education."^{xi}

29. The situation in Lebanon poses several challenges to the full enjoyment of this human right, particularly with regard to elements of affordability, security of tenure, habitability, and equal and nondiscriminatory access. This includes: the high cost of housing relative to wage levels, the mismatch between what is supplied and what is demanded in the housing sector, the rising inequality in income and wealth and the economic disparities between areas, the dominance of a real estate development paradigm based on demolition and eviction.

30. Lebanese authorities have refrained from developing and implementing a housing policy based on the principles of social responsibility, and have instead enacted policies that encourage the commodification of lands through real estate speculation and financialization, marginalizing people's right to housing, and contributing to their eviction from their neighborhoods.

31. Housing policies implemented are limited to ownership through housing loans. Thus, they work for the benefit of the banking sector and real estate developers in the first place, and they are not sufficient to meet the needs of the largest segment of the population.

32. Old rent agreements (where rent amounts are minimal and landlords are unable to change tenants or rent prices) account for 20% of the total housing stock in Beirut's old and historic neighborhoods. Tenants on old agreements include various social groups, including those who do not have complete rights or significant resources, such as those with limited incomes, people with disabilities, and non-Lebanese residents, and most of them are social groups whose resources decrease over time, such as retirees or the elderly. Those are living under the threat of eviction and displacement without having access to housing alternatives due to a new law on old rents (approved in 2014 and amended in 2017) which stripped many of the old tenants of the guarantee of their right to housing.

33. The rate of evictions in Beirut is two cases per three buildings^{xii}, which is very high. These evictions have a major impact on the population, especially on vulnerable groups with no access to justice and no alternative housing options.

34. Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon suffer from an inadequate infrastructure, including an overlap between the drinking water and sewage network, high humidity, water seepage, poor ventilation, and lack of sunlight in most houses in Palestinian camps and gatherings

We urge the Human Rights Council and the Working Group to call upon Lebanon's government to:

35. Adopt a law that establishes the right to housing and provides the foundation for a comprehensive housing policy following an inclusive, participatory, systematic and multidisciplinary approach in legislation. Drafting the law should take into account a number of aspects, including: sustainable development policy, directions for urban growth, public

transportation between areas, the state's right to intervene in rents prices and rent contracts.

36. Suspend the Rent Law (2014/2017) and amend the rent law (1992) and enact one universal rent law that prioritizes the right to housing, controls rents and link rent prices to the minimum wage and inflation, and includes stipulations specifically for the poorest populations. towards adopting a law guaranteeing the right to housing in Lebanon that is based on sustainable development policy, addressing informal housing at urban level; reviewing credit mechanisms; and addressing evacuation

37. Elaborate a modern real estate policy in Lebanon through the intervention of the public authority to limit speculation in land prices, including the development of a progressive tax on unconstructed lands, built lands, ownership of abandoned buildings, and ownership of vacant apartments.

38. Ensure fair housing allowance in minimum wage policy taking into account high cost of living

39. Require every construction of a new residential building to include a number of affordable units, as a prerequisite for obtaining a building permit. This recommendation is supported by Article 13 of the Building Law (2004/363) which allows local authorities to refuse to grant a building permit in case the building conflicts with the "public interest."

d. The Human Right to Education

40. Compulsory quality education and the integration of children with special needs into formal education system constituted the major issues covered by the recommendations received in relation to the right to education during the 2nd cycle.

41. Lebanon recognized the need for adopting a roadmap to transform the performance of the education system and announced a 2030 Education Strategy^{xiii} within Agenda 2030, aiming to improve students' learning outcomes and skills with a clear focus on equity.

42. However, the educational system in Lebanon continues to suffer from various problems, including verbalism in education, the need for private lessons, long hours of studying, in addition to quality gaps between the private- and public-sector education.

43. Key challenges for public education remain low educational and administrative staff qualifications in public schools, absence of a suitable educational environment (buildings and equipment), administrative and regulatory systems incompatible with development requirements, weakness in foreign languages, lack of curriculum supporting information technology and communication as an educational method.

44. The Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE) previously recognized the widening achievement gap between public and private schools,^{xiv} yet it has not improved.

45. Private schools are considered a substitute for formal public education, given the deterioration of the level of formal education after the 1975–91 Civil War. Students enrolled in private schools numbered more than half a million out of a million students in 2019–20.

46. Given the absence of laws that protect the human right to education, private educational institutions may implement arbitrary measures. For instance, school fees increased 400% between 2010 and 2018, while the cost index was set at 121%.^{xv} Before the 2019 economic crisis, 23% of families were unable to pay the school tuition in full, and the deficit continued with the new school year until the failure to pay reached 70%.

47. Transition from private to public schools is expected to surge in 2020, given the inability to pay tuition amid the financial crisis and the rise in the cost of living. This requires further funding for public education infrastructure to absorb the newcomers.

48. Integrating children with special needs into education remains inadequate already two decades years after promulgating Rights of Disabled Persons Law No. 2000/220. Few public or private schools implement this law, whether for locative environment, curriculum or qualified staff to deal with students with disabilities in the classrooms. The same situation prevails in UNRWA schools, which do not meet the requirements of an inclusive environment. Only 18 schools are so equipped.

We urge the Human Rights Council and the Working Group to call upon Lebanon’s government to:

49. Enhance the quality of public education, developing a new unified curriculum, establishing and implementing quality-oriented strategies, especially in rural areas, and adapting the school environment to the basic needs of persons with disabilities.

50. Focus reform efforts maintaining increased enrolment rates, reducing and reinserting dropouts, giving incentives for teachers to serve in poor areas, establishing continuing education programs for teachers and expanding maintenance of the existing educational infrastructure.

e. The Human Right to Decent Work

51. As in Lebanon’s first UPR, the second cycle emphasized child labor, as well as the right to work for Palestinian refugees, people with disabilities and migrant workers. Although these constitute key problematics for the full enjoyment of the human right to decent work in Lebanon, it overlooked the need to adopt a comprehensive employment policy and support the productive sector, which generates sustainable and decent employment opportunities.

52. Unemployment, especially among young people, has been at the center of Lebanese protests, but no progress has manifest toward adopting a national plan to promote job creation and move progressively toward the full realization of this human right. The state has also not been publishing any official unemployment rate, which impedes any intervention to curb unemployment.

53. During the last quarter of 2019, Lebanon witnessed large waves of arbitrary dismissals, wage deductions and a range of other violations under the pretext of difficult economic conditions. The lockdown measures imposed in response to COVID-19 have exacerbated the economic decline and, therefore, accelerated job losses and disruptions. While no official statistics have been published, the acting head of the General Confederation of Lebanese Workers (CGTL) announced in February 2020 that 10,000 workers have lost their jobs, while 60,000 employees suffered a 50-percent cut in their salaries.^{xvi}

54. The private sector has also revealed its volatility during this crisis. A study based on a sample of 300 businesses from a variety of sectors and regions in Lebanon estimated that 220,000 jobs were lost since mid-October.^{xvii}

55. Despite obligations under Article 8 of ICESCR and ILO Convention 98,^{xviii} the unions present in Lebanon have no role, derogating the collective dimension of the right to work and preventing workers from remedial action for violations resulting from institutions’ and companies’ efforts to prioritize returns and profits.

56. The Labor Law does not define, or otherwise address sexual or moral harassment, even though sexual harassment is the most-severe abuse affecting the dignity of all its victims, especially women and girls. Several bills have been proposed to explicitly criminalize sexual harassment, including a bill submitted by the Minister of State for Women’s Affairs and approved by the Co M in 2017, but parliament has not approved it yet.

57. In July 2019, the Minister of Labor initiated the so-called “Plan to Combat Illegal Foreign Workers in Lebanon,” whose application affected Palestinian workers and employers, in contravention of previous laws and decisions approved by the Lebanese Parliament since August 2010. Dozens were dismissed from their jobs, tens of businesses run by Palestinians were closed, while Palestinian university and technical school graduates and various professionals were barred from working.^{xix}

58. Lebanon expanded maternity leave to 10 weeks, but has not ratified International Labor Organization’s Convention No. 183 on Maternity Protection, which recommends a 14-week leave.

59. Migrant workers undergo violations under the notorious *kafala* (guardianship) system, rendering migrant domestic workers dependent on employers whim and leaves them vulnerable to exploitation. No political will has manifested to improve the legal status of migrant workers, nor for ratifying the Migrant Workers Convention. Violations of domestic workers rights include excessive working hours, nonpayment of wages, confinement in the

workplace and in some cases physical and sexual abuse. During the pandemic, forced eviction and abandonment have counted among the abuses.^{xx}

We urge the Human Rights Council and the Working Group to call upon Lebanon’s government to:

60. Remedy the structural causes of unemployment, including jobless economic growth, by supporting productive sectors at national level for sustainable job generation and ensure the adoption of a fair tax system that stimulates local productivity
61. Ensure employment with remuneration that enables workers and their families to enjoy an adequate standard of living as stipulated in Articles 7(a)(ii) and 11 of ICESCR and Article 46 of the Labor Law
62. Amend the Labor Law to deter and penalize sexual harassment and gender-based exploitation and discrimination against working women, and establish a corresponding workplace monitor mechanism in both public and the private sector.
63. Ratify International ILO Convention No. 44 (1934) and provide compensation or allowances to people unemployed against their will, and establish an unemployment fund.
64. Abolish the obtain authorization requirement to form a union in favor of a formal public notice like the Associations Law, liberate unions from Ministry of Labor and ratify fundamental ILO Freedom of Association and Right to Organise Convention No. 87.
65. Ensure that the minimum wage enable a decent standard of living for workers and their families, including indexing it with the cost of living and implementing vigorous enforcement measures.
66. Abolish the *kafala* system; ratify and implement the ILO Domestic Workers Convention No. 189 to abolish the premise that domestics are either ‘servants,’ ‘members of the family’ or second-class workers.
67. Rescind discriminatory restrictions on Palestinian refugees’ access to the labor market, penalizing violations of decent working conditions for them, including lack of employment benefits, insecure job tenure and differential treatment in the workplace.

f. The Human Right to Social Security

68. The most-vulnerable populations such as the older persons, persons with disabilities, the unemployed, migrant workers, refugees, farmers and informal sector workers remain outside most formal social-protection systems.
69. More than half of workers (56%) are informal.^{xxi} They and their families are deprived of health care, compelling them to spend more of their income on health services, which leads to further pressure on wages that are already not sufficient to cover living costs, including housing, health, education, and food.
70. On 16 February 2017, the Lebanese Parliament enacted Law No. 27: Benefit from the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) for Retirees Enrolled in the Sickness and Maternity Scheme. Despite its title, the law obfuscates the issues for several reasons. It requires beneficiaries to pay a contribution to this fund, although they are no longer productive or have a source of income, especially in light of the failure to shift from an end of service indemnity scheme to a pension-and-social-protection scheme. Moreover, retirees beneficiaries would have previously paid all their contributions during the time they were employed, which means imposing additional contributions, although they do not work. The law benefits retirees with 20 years of service. However, only 50% of workers have subscribed to the NSSF since its 1963 establishment, meaning that half of the retiring workforce would not benefit. Some sectors are excluded from the NSSF or labor laws, such as agriculture, by default disqualifying those workers from benefit under law No. 27.
71. Law 128/2010 amended Article 9 of the Social Security Law, eliminating the condition of reciprocity by other countries when it comes to social security benefits offered by Lebanon to non-nationals. However, the amendment still denies Palestinian refugee workers their right to health benefits and family allowances, especially maternity allowances. Although Palestinian refugee workers in Lebanon who are registered at the NSSF still have to

pay the full fees (23.5%) of their salary similarly to Lebanese workers, they can only benefit from end-of-service indemnity (amounting to 8.5% of the total amount paid) and not from any other service.

72. The Labor Law, Article 3 and Social Security Law, Article 46 provide for benefits to male workers and civil servants, but not to female workers. For example, male employees can obtain compensation for non-working wives, while female employees can do this only if their husband is dead or suffers from a debilitating disease.

73. Article 10 of the Benefits and Services Regulations in the State Employees Cooperative and Article 14 of the Social Security Law discriminate against women in relation to their husbands' access to health care, hospitalization, and other benefits.

We urge the Human Rights Council and the Working Group to call upon Lebanon's government to:

74. Close gaps in the social-protection system, adopting a comprehensive system based on a human rights approach that includes refugees, displaced persons and migrant workers.

75. Prioritize tax system reform to contribute to financing a comprehensive social-protection system and stimulate inclusive and equitable economic growth that, in turn, will generate more income and decent and sustainable jobs, while strengthening the social-protection system.

76. Ratify ILO Convention Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention No. 102 (1952) and apply ILO Social Protection Floors Recommendation No. 202 (2012).

77. Amend Law 2010/128 to allow Palestinian refugee workers to enjoy their full human right to social security, as obligated under ICESCR Article 9.

g. The Human Right to Health

78. The second UPR posed a key challenge to fulfill the human right to health in Lebanon, namely to close the quality gap between the private and public services and remedy their increasing costs.

79. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), only 8% of the population benefit from the Lebanese government's primary care. Health-service delivery is dominated by the private sector, which accounts for more than 90% of all services.^{xxii}

80. Lebanese authorities acknowledge^{xxiii} challenges of the public-health system, including financial constraints, understaffing (specifically an imbalance between medical doctors and nurses, paramedics and administrative staff), a focus on tertiary care and poorly regulated ambulatory care.

81. Whereas the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) Strategy 2025, launched in 2017, prioritizes universal health coverage, huge gap remain in implementation given that the most-vulnerable populations such as the older persons, persons with disabilities, the unemployed, migrant workers, refugees, farmers, and informal-sector workers remain outside coverage.

82. In its latest statistics (2016), MoPH revealed that, in all the country's regions, the number of public hospitals is meager when compared to private hospitals. The largest gap was in Mount Lebanon, with only 5 public hospitals, compared to 47 private hospitals, followed by the Beqaa region with 5 public hospitals, versus 21 private.^{xxiv}

83. The government fails to reimburse private and public hospitals, including funds owed by NSSF and military health funds, impeding staff payments and medical supply purchases, and thus services.

84. Affordability of health care services is more elusive amid the COVID-19 pandemic, thus necessitating a comprehensive policy aimed at universal and publicly provided health care, as well as extending social-protection coverage to include the unprotected

We urge the Human Rights Council and the Working Group to call upon Lebanon’s government to:

85. Implement healthcare reform based on universal access to public healthcare and enact a comprehensive health coverage law that assures quality healthcare to vulnerable groups.

86. Strengthen the state’s regulatory role in the health sector, defining the different public and private stakeholders’ roles, monitoring their performance, thus rooting out corruption and waste, and enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of health administration.

87. Ensure the availability, accessibility and affordability of the highest attainable standard of health to all citizens and inhabitants through supporting infrastructure development in hospitals where necessary and upgrading medical equipment and redressing regional disparities.¹

- ⁱ For a detailed analysis, check https://civilsociety-centre.org/sites/default/files/ls-what-mobilises-lebanon-oct2019-en_0.jpg
- ⁱⁱ ANND has been monitoring the implementation of the recommendations received from the 2nd cycle and the evolving situation since the start of the protests in Lebanon closely. Inputs provided to this submission have benefitted significantly from the previous work done; including UPR Midterm-Report and bi-weekly e-bulletins produced by ANND. See more information at: <http://www.annd.org/english/itemId.php?itemId=664#sthash.HakZuz9m.dpbs> <http://www.annd.org/english/itemId.php?itemId=749#sthash.uTDNVpeC.dpbs>
- ⁱⁱⁱ Lebanon’s public debt currently amounts to roughly 86 billion USD (excluding the financial dues of public institutions including the National Social Security Fund), equivalent to 150% of GDP.
- ^{iv} See more at <https://www.lcps-lebanon.org/agendaArticle.php?id=154>.
- ^v http://www.annd.org/data/file/files/01%20ANND-TAXJustice2017-Regional_Lebanon.pdf.
- ^{vi} The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) directed the same recommendation to Lebanon in follow up its ICESCR. See CESCR, Concluding Observations: Lebanon, E/C.12/LBN/CO2, 24 October 2016, at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fc.12%2flBN%2fCO%2f2&Lang=en.
- ^{vii} World Bank, “Lebanon is in the Midst of Economic, Financial and Social Hardship, Situation Could Get worse,” 6 November 2019, at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/11/06/world-bank-lebanon-is-in-the-midst-of-economic-financial-and-social-hardship-situation-could-get-worse>.
- ^{viii} See the financial recovery plan at: <http://www.leadersclub.com.lb/Download/GovernmentPlanApril302020.pdf>.
- ^{ix} IMF, 2018. “Opportunity for All. Promoting Growth and Inclusiveness in the Middle East and North Africa.” <file:///C:/Users/nizar/Downloads/45981-dp1811-opportunity-for-all.pdf>
- ^x “Work towards additional efforts to promote economic and social rights, to enhance in particular the right to work, education, health and housing.” Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Lebanon, A/HRC/31/5, 22 December 2015, Recommendation 132.166, p. 24, at: <https://undocs.org/A/HRC/31/5>.
- ^{xi} OHCHR, “Fact Sheet No. 21: The Right to Adequate Housing,” Rev. 1, at: https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/fs21_rev_1_housing_en.pdf
- ^{xii} According to a survey by Public Works Studio (2016 -2018) <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/19624LebanonVNR2018.pdf>
- ^{xiii} <https://www.mehe.gov.lb/ar/Projects/%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A9%20%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%20%D9%85%D9%86%20%D8%A3%D8%AC%D9%84%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9%202010%20-%202015/ESDP%20English%20FINAL%20-p%201.pdf>
- ^{xv} The increase in the school fees is conditional on the increase in teachers’ wages, which did not exceed 80% from 121% during this period.
- ^{xvi} “10,000 workers lose jobs in Lebanon as nationwide protests continue,” *Xinuanet* (6 February 2020), at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-02/06/c_138758980.htm.
- ^{xvii} “220,000 jobs lost estimated by InfoPro: 40 percent reduction in salaries and 12 percent of companies ceased operation,” *BusinessNews.com.lb* (7 February 2020), at: <http://www.businessnews.com.lb/cms/Story/StoryDetails/7423/220,000-jobs-lost-estimated-by-InfoPro>.
- ^{xviii} The Lebanese Labor Law distinguishes between the freedom to form associations and political parties and the formation of syndicates and unions; as the former require only a notification, while the latter requires authorization. Accordingly, the application to form a union is submitted to the Ministry of Labor which consults with the Ministry of Interior. Moreover, laws in force require that unions’ activities remain under permanent monitoring and supervision of the Ministry of Labor.
- ^{xix} “Palestinians Boycott Meeting With Lebanese Labor Minister,” *Asharq al-Awsat* (30 July 2020), at: <https://english.aawsat.com//home/article/1835936/palestinians-boycott-meeting-lebanese-labor-minister>.
- ^{xx} “Ethiopian domestic workers abandoned on Beirut street by employers,” *The Nation* (June 2020), at: https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/ethiopian-domestic-workers-abandoned-on-beirut-street-by-employers-1.1029708?fbclid=IwAR0TLI4kzhkZyblR9JZ-2PUCYGuRbENP12tm9O_Ud4J4FIUtiFDUHTHzg; “Eviction of refugees from Beirut building sparks xenophobic comments online,” *Observers/France24* (23 May 2020), at: <https://observers.france24.com/en/20190527-eviction-refugees-beirut-building-sparks-xenophobic-comments-online>.

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- ^{xxi} <http://www.annd.org/cd/arabwatch2016/pdf/english/13.pdf>
- ^{xxii} <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/concrete-results-lebanon-s-local-development-initiatives>
- ^{xxiii} <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/19624LebanonVNR2018.pdf>
- ^{xxiv} <https://blog.blominvestbank.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/The-Healthcare-System-in-Lebanon-1.pdf>