

I. Background and Framework

A. International obligations

1. During its 2016 Universal Periodic Review, Sudan agreed to increase “efforts” to accede to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (138.6), and also to ratify the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrants Workers and their Families (140.17). However, Sudan has not taken any steps toward ratifying either convention. Despite Sudan’s 2021 ratification of the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED), Sudan has not acted to publicize, implement, or otherwise change practices related to torture and forced disappearance, which occur with regularity.

2. Nor is Sudan party to the Rome Statute or the International Criminal Court, despite its 2016 commitment to “cooperate fully with United Nations and other international human rights monitors to help promote accountability” (140.31).

3. Likewise, despite its commitment to “ratify the African Union Maputo Protocol on the rights of women in Africa” (138.13), Sudan is not party to any of the optional protocols of the African Charter, including the Maputo protocol, nor separate protocols on the creation of a human rights court, the rights of the elderly, or the well-being of children.

4. Sudan should:

- Accede to and implement the CEDAW, the Maputo Protocol, and related optional protocols, before its fourth Universal Periodic Review (UPR).
- Ratify the Rome Statute and the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court before its Fourth UPR;
- Remove reservations to treaties to which it is a party, and adopt the Optional Protocols for those treaties, including the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the CAT.

B. Constitutional and legislative framework

Failure to implement comprehensive, effective legal framework for human rights and equality

5. Despite some progress toward adopting a new Constitution and reforming “all national laws” to be in conformity with international human rights and humanitarian law, as it agreed to do in 2016 (138.15, 140.23), Sudan has not done so in a comprehensive manner that would lead to these reforms being given full legal and practical effect. The August 2019 Constitutional Declaration introduced basic rights and freedoms; however, these rights remain largely unprotected due to failure to fully integrate reforms into the legal framework. For example, penal code reforms in 2020 outlawed female genital mutilation (FGM), removed the death penalty and corporal punishment for minors, and introduced harsher penalties for rape and for the use of torture by public officials. However, the broader legal framework undermines these reforms’ effects: for example, the prohibition on FGM has not been publicized or enforced at the local level; rules of evidence (among other legal and societal barriers) preclude most rape trials from going forward; and rape and torture still lack legal definitions that would render the reforms enforceable, in spite of Sudan’s 2016 commitments to do so -(138.28, 138.75).

6. Sudan has also largely failed to implement effective measures for the protection of marginalized and vulnerable groups that are entitled to rights and protection under Sudan’s Interim Constitution as well as under international law. Specifically, it has not upheld its commitments to adopt an effective definition of torture; to adopt and reform laws and policies prohibiting “the dissemination of ideas based on racial and ethnic hatred and incitement to racial discrimination and violence”; to “ensure full respect for freedom of religion or belief and [...] ethnic and religious minorities”; to “fight” and “devise an effective response to” all forms of violence against women, including by criminalizing violence and sexual attacks; and to “repeal all laws that discriminate against women and girls,” including by prohibiting child, early and forced marriage (138.75, 138.15, 138.18, 138.24, 138.28, 138.77, 138.25, 140.21). For example, laws continue to limit women’s inheritance rights and criminalize Muslim women in interfaith marriages. Sudan has also failed to “introduce a comprehensive definition of racial discrimination related to the constitutional provisions on equality and non-discrimination” (138.18).

7. In addition, the process of legal reforms has fallen short of Sudan’s commitment to “ensure transparency of institutional reforms and wide participation of NGOs throughout the adoption of the new Constitution” (138.17). While consultations with the Freedom and Change Coalition (FCC) were held during drafting and negotiations, DWAG received testimonies from women and leading women’s NGOs and coalitions, including leaders of the popular uprisings, that they continue to be sidelined and underrepresented in these processes. The Sovereign Council, for example, is comprised of 12 men and 2 women (<15% representation), despite commitments in the Interim Constitution and the Juba Agreement to 40% representation of women in the transitional government. The systematic exclusion of a cohort representing half of the population cannot be considered to conform with standards of transparency or participatory governance.

8. The Interim Constitution grants qualified immunity for past crimes to those serving in upper echelons of government. Under the Interim Constitution, only the Transitional Legislative Council can lift, by majority vote, the procedural immunity otherwise granted to members of the Sovereignty Council, the Cabinet, the Transitional Legislative Council, governors of provinces, and heads of regions. However, the TMC has repeatedly delayed appointing the Transitional Legislative body, in violation of its commitment to do so within three months under the Interim Constitution. In part, this also means that women's leadership in the transition remains limited: 40% of the Transitional Legislative Council seats are to be filled with women representatives, while women's participation across transitional government bodies remains under 15% as of writing.

9. Legal reforms under the Interim Constitution and are not reliably implemented by authorities. Sudan should publicize and ensure compliance with laws that are critical to the protection of human rights, including the recent criminalization of FGM, the appeal of Article 152 (which previously prescribed women's style of clothing—frequently used to target ethnic and religious minorities—and further requiring women to secure a male guardian's consent when traveling with children), the abolition of Article 126 of the penal code (previously criminalizing apostasy), and the ban on torture and forced confessions. In addition, a 2019 Supreme Court decision has enabled women to pass down citizenship to their children, whereas previously only men could do so. However, Sudanese legal experts report that a number of bylaws that can prevent women from passing on citizenship rights remain in place.

10. Sudan should:

- Constitute the Transitional Legislative Council and other transitional mechanisms without delay, in keeping with the timeline and commitments outlined in the Interim Constitution and the Juba Agreement, and ensure that these mechanisms' members are representative of all social groups in Sudan;
- Repeal, pass, publicize, and/or implement all Constitutional provisions, laws, regulations, bylaws, ordinances and customary rules to bring the legal framework fully in line with human rights and humanitarian law;
- Introduce enforceable legal definitions of torture, rape, adultery, racial discrimination, and other crimes, in line with international human rights and humanitarian law;
- Put in place permanent and enforceable mechanisms to ensure the reliable and inclusive participation of civil society, including women and marginalized populations, in legal and policy reform processes, including those agreed to in the Juba Agreement.

C. Institutional and human rights infrastructure and policy measures

11. Despite commitments to strengthen the institutionalization of human rights (138.29, 138.38, 138.40, 138.43, 138.47), Sudan's National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) lacks a clear mandate, is chronically under-resourced, and is not accredited under the Paris Principles. Since the expiration of the NHRC's Strategic Plan for 2014–2018, no new plan has been adopted, and the NHRC itself has not undergone reform since the governmental transition began in 2019. Rather, it continues to operate in lockstep with government interests rather than as an independent watchdog. For example, following the massacre of civilians at a peaceful sit-in on June 3, 2019, the NHRC issued a report claiming that the government had no responsibility for the attacks and deaths, despite ample evidence to the contrary.

12. In 2020 Sudan adopted a new National Action Plan (NAP) for Women Peace and Security, but the plan has not been publicized and little action has been taken to integrate the 1325 NAP into government planning. For example, DWAG noted that discussions of government programming during National Women's Week 2021 did not discuss the NAP. This falls short of Sudan's commitments to institutionalize the protection of women's rights and the promotion of gender equality (138.29, 138.30, 138.34).

13. Sudan should:

- Create an independent National Human Rights Commission for Sudan, and designate sufficient resources for it to operate and to obtain accreditation under the Paris Principles before Sudan's next UPR;
- Put in place formal mechanisms and funding for the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the rights and women and girls and gender equality, including the goals outlined in its 1325 NAP.

II. Promotion and protection of human rights on the ground

A. Cooperation with human rights mechanisms

14. Sudan's cooperation with international human rights mechanisms has improved since its previous UPR review, but important shortcomings persist, contrary to its 2016 commitments to "cooperate fully with United Nations and other international human rights monitors to help promote accountability" (140.31).

15. DWAG is aware of identified victims and witnesses in each of five ICC cases involving Sudan who face potential threats of retaliation but are not receiving requested government protections.

16. Progress in formal cooperation includes the repeal of criminal law provisions that prevented cooperation with the ICC, the reception of the ICC Prosecutor's office mission to Sudan in October 2020, and the February 2021 signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with the prosecutor in the case against Ali Kushayb. However, Sudan has not permitted in situ investigations in Darfur in relation to ICC cases¹⁷ and it has not agreed to transfer custody of three individuals wanted by the ICC for war crimes, including Omar Al-Bashir.

17. Sudan cooperates only somewhat with international mechanisms and mandates, and has not issued standing invitations to UN special procedures despite commitments to do so (138.59, 138.60, 138.61, 138.62, 139.1, 140.31). Sudan has yet to receive visits from the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, and the Special Rapporteurs on contemporary forms of slavery and on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance despite long-standing requests.

18. Sudan has not engaged with African Union human rights processes. It has missed all of its five reporting deadlines to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights since 2012.

B. Implementation of international human rights obligations, taking into account applicable international humanitarian law

Cross-cutting issue 1: Risk of atrocities and failure to uphold the Responsibility to Protect

19. Ongoing patterns of human rights violations documented in Sudan reveal an extremely high number of risk factors and indicators for atrocity crimes. While Sudan has taken some steps toward improving the human rights situation, it deliberately perpetuates policies that reinforce or increase these risks, demonstrating an unwillingness to meet its responsibility to protect its citizens from violations of international humanitarian law, or to implement its UPR commitments (138.34, 140.37, 140.48).

20. From 2016 to 2021, Sudan has failed to address or prevent patterns of human rights violations against groups protected under international human rights and humanitarian law, including women and girls as well as ethnic, racial, and religious minorities. This has been particularly true in the regions of Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Eastern Sudan despite the regions' history of atrocities targeting those groups. DWAG has received and verified reports from local news outlets, human rights defenders, independent community leaders, and witnesses of frequent crimes which include violent attacks, looting, burning homes, and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Civilian protection, especially for minorities, such as Darfuris and those living in the Nuba Mountains (including those displaced to Eastern Sudan), remains a pressing issue. Conflict-affected, historically marginalised women are disproportionately targeted for gendered rights violations in an environment of near-complete impunity. The most-targeted locations include camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs)—which have high populations of women and girls—as well as the Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Eastern Sudan regions. However, these marginalised groups continue to face attacks in all regions.

21. Sudan has not taken meaningful action to intervene or mediate tensions as attacks continue to escalate. DWAG has observed armed conflict and instability, alongside intergroup tensions and patterns of discrimination and hate speech, that constitute specific risk factors for genocide, including the targeting of groups that have historically faced persecution and atrocities (Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit tribes in Darfur as well as women and girls). Such attacks escalated somewhat toward the end of 2020, and even more acutely in 2021 with the withdrawal of UNAMID. Examples most strikingly include the January 2021 attack in El Geneina whereby 163 were killed and 123,000 people displaced by armed gunmen and the February 9 2021 El Geneina follow-on attack which shut down the city. DWAG's network has reported witnessing Arab tribes deploying ethnically charged rhetoric in public: one reported public calls that "we shall not let these people walk, travel, drive cars, or hold office," referring to indigenous African tribes, in the weeks leading up to the 2020 and 2021 attacks.

22. Sudan has also perpetuated governing structures that have contributed to past atrocities and patterns of violence. For example, Sudan announced its intention to deploy the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) for the protection of Darfur, despite the direct involvement of many RSF members in past violence, and evidence that many continue to take part in attacks on civilians. Meanwhile, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ("Hemedti"), who is closely tied to past atrocities committed by the Janjaweed, the Deputy

Chairman of the Sovereign Council, also exercises control over the RSF. Many of its officers also hold positions within the Interim Government. The RSF remains a separate unit from the Sudanese army and has resisted integration efforts, thus reducing oversight. Nor is DWAG's network aware of any steps been taken to create truth-telling or other transitional justice mechanisms, despite mentions of such measures in the Juba Agreement.

23. Sudan has not taken effective measures in response to Arab tribe/Indigenous African tribe conflict. Local community leaders in Darfur report to DWAG that there is a chronic failure to hold attackers from Arab tribes accountable for attacks against Indigenous African tribes or against police, either nationally or at the local level, contribute to the perpetuation and escalation of violence. On the other hand, if a member of an indigenous African tribe were to assault an Arab herder, community leaders report that the tribes locate and deliver perpetrators in their community to the proper authorities.

24. Since the transition began in 2019, the government has inflamed tensions by appointing new administrators, or Wali, over traditional leaders in peripheral territories. Leaders from Arab tribes continue to be appointed to top positions of power, including the Sovereign Council Chair and Deputy Chair, Abdel Fattah El Burhan and Hemedti. On the local level, such appointments are perceived as provocation and intentionally humiliating to non-Arab tribes. In Kabkabiya province, for example, community members expressed outrage to DWAG that leaders who have been a part of the previous regime hold high positions in formal leadership even if they are of a lower traditional status than Indigenous African leaders.

25. Inversely, Indigenous African leaders do not reliably receive government support or protection. In February 2021, for example, human rights defenders reported to DWAG that there was an assassination attempt on the Wali of El Geneina, West Darfur, who comes from traditional leadership and has strong ties with Darfuri residents. He had contacted the government in Khartoum and the military and police for assistance beforehand, but the government did not respond or initiate any investigation after the attack.

26. Sudan's budgetary priorities also reflect a capacity to commit atrocity crimes. Sudan allocates a large portion of the national budget to the military, and financial decisions are overseen by Deputy Chairman of the Sovereignty Council Hemedti. Military leaders in the interim government control the lucrative mining and foreign investment sectors and also receives aid from foreign allies.

Cross-cutting issue 2: Equality/non-discrimination and responsibility to protect

27. The heightened risk of atrocities is also reflected in the gendered dynamics of ongoing violence and human rights violations that impose the brunt of violence disproportionately on women: (1) insufficient efforts to acknowledge, address and counteract a culture of gender-based discrimination and violence; (2) perpetuation of a culture of impunity for the use of sexual and gender-based violence against women from certain ethnic groups; (3) deliberate marginalization and exclusion of women HRDs and civil society leaders who played a key role in the revolution.

28. Discrimination against women is deeply linked to other patterns of discrimination that continue to lead to severe violence against a range of groups protected by international humanitarian law. Sudan's policies create a deliberate, multi-layered environment of inequality and harmful norms, beliefs and practices toward women. The culture, socialization, and attitudes of Sudanese society in recent history are built around male superiority, domination, and their "right" of control over women's behavior and actions. This increases the likelihood for GBV, VAW, and other forms of gender-based discrimination, especially for women in marginalized groups. For example, marital rape is not criminalized and victims highlight a lack of reporting mechanisms for SGBV.

29. Gender inequality in Sudan is based in large part in the same politicized interpretations of Islam and Arabization policies that underlie discriminatory patterns of violence against indigenous Africans, particularly in Darfur and the Two Areas. In numerous interviews, DWAG has found that in times of conflict, these inequalities can be directly correlated to gendered expressions of violence against women, men, girls, and boys, especially those belonging to groups that are already marginalized due to perceived deviation from religious, ethnic, or other norms.

30. Women's sequestration to the home, in legal and social subservience to men, as well as their deprivation of social and economic resources (including access to paid work, control over any financial assets, land ownership, and critical access to information and communications) put them into positions of extreme vulnerability when violent conflict and crises hit: for instance, they are often expected to be the first to deprive themselves of food and water, and the first to take on additional responsibilities for family caregiving, leading to increased rates of conflict-related malnutrition, starvation and thirst, disease, and physical vulnerability to violence due to reduced mobility associated with caregiving, socio/legal restrictions on public movement and appearance, and poor health.

31. 2019 Interim Constitutional commitments to address this discrimination and inequity have not been followed by meaningful action. Institutional practices, particularly by law enforcement, are routinely violent and discriminatory toward women. DWAG observes firsthand, in corroboration with

partner and stakeholder reports, that a general backdrop of police harassment and intimidation of women prevails.

32. Under the current Interim Government, Sudan has not taken sufficient action to counteract norms built up around what Bashir previously described as the “ideal Sudanese woman.” No women leaders from the revolution were appointed to any decision-making seat in the interim government. DWAG’s broad-based consultation meetings reveal that Women human rights advocates, movement activists, civil servants, public sector professionals, and journalists have continued to be targeted by threats and intimidation through reputational attacks, harassment, extrajudicial arrests, beatings, and rape. Systematic use of rape as weapon of war, both previously and in an ongoing manner, has continued with impunity without sufficient effort from previous government or interim/transitional government to address.

33. Survivors whom DWAG has been in contact with feel uncomfortable reporting violence to hostile authorities, instances of violence are not taken seriously by authorities, survivors are often ostracized by loved ones (and those that do not cut ties with survivors may themselves be stigmatized through association) and considered “spoiled” by society, and there is even a widespread sense that the government may deliberately cover up incidents of gender-based violence. Thus, Sudan’s laws, policies, tolerance for and promotion of expressions and acts of gendered violence erode the distinctions between daily inequities and violence against women and severe gendered atrocities, creating a feedback loop of discrimination, inequality and increasing levels of planned and unplanned violence. Sudan should act to prevent such atrocities by eradicating cultural norms of inequality and violence proactively.

34. The disparity in access to decision-making between women in Darfur and ongoing women’s participation efforts at the national level has also persisted, if not widened, since the TMC came into power. Across all programmatic sectors, DWAG has noted that national and international interventions remain confined to Khartoum and do not reach women residing in Darfur and the Two Areas. Subsequently inattentive policies have only inflamed existing tensions, furthered division and alienated these women.

35. Sudan should:

- Publicly condemn discrimination, hate speech, and attacks against these groups and instead act to defuse tensions, support reconciliation, and recognize the equal rights of women and men of all

ethnicities, religions, and tribal affiliations.

- Ensure that the RSF are not deployed in areas where atrocity crimes took place; that RSF leaders who led or participated in atrocity crimes are brought to account; and that the remaining RSF members are trained in human rights standards and obligations.
- Ensure that political appointments do not fuel social divisions, especially those that mirror the divisions underlying past atrocities in Sudan, and that acts of violence against indigenous African tribes are punished appropriately according to the law.
- Allocate funds in accordance with human rights standards, to respect, protect and promote the realization of human rights; it must not continue to fund persons and institutions responsible for widespread human rights violations.

D. Civil and political rights

Impunity / Access to Justice

36. Regarding the ICC: On June 9th, 2020, Ali Kushayb, one of the leaders of the genocide wanted by the ICC surrendered himself to peacekeeping forces in the Central African Republic for immediate transfer to the Hague. Three other Sudanese government officials – Omar al-Bashir, Abdelrahim Hussein, and Ahmed Haroun – are additionally detained in Khartoum awaiting trial arrangements through the ICC and Sudanese national judiciary. As the ICC moves toward Kushayb’s trial, with a confirmation of charges hearing scheduled for June 2021, the affected communities have not been adequately oriented on ICC procedure and their rights for participation, representation, and compensation within the trial. Security and visibility concerns, including retaliation against victims and witnesses, continue to plague the areas affected by Kushayb’s crimes.

37. Sudan has yet to initiate genuine investigations or prosecutions into the most serious crimes in Darfur. Most recently, a commission was appointed to investigate the violence against peaceful protesters at the June 3rd massacre, but the composition of the commission —all men—revealed a lack of seriousness about investigating the full extent of the violence against civilians, which featured extensive gender-based violence and included the rape of at least 90 women and X men, and leading to the deaths of three women by suicide. Out of 90 women who were allegedly raped, only 4 came forward and all were fearful . DWAG conducted interviews to find the official committee also faced serious capacity limitations and, despite clear evidence to the contrary, concluded that the government had no responsibility for the massacre.

38. Similar to its efforts on the June 3rd investigative committee, Sudan has made no serious attempts to investigate ongoing crimes committed by the RSF in Darfur despite their demonstrated capacity to investigate other crimes. For example, in one incident in Khartoum, police abducted and tortured a man to death. The family was able to mobilize the public to force police to investigate and punish those responsible.

39. The judiciary lacks independence, as evidenced by the political decision to bring Bashir for trial on solely charges of corruption. Sudanese national judiciary is undergoing reform with new appointments at the highest level, but DWAG has received complaints that low-level judiciary staff are all the same as from Bashir's regime. In addition, Sudan has demonstrated ambivalence and a lack of political willpower to ensure women and minorities' representation in the judiciary. The first appointment of a female chief justice, Neemat Abdullah, is an important step forward but only occurred after widespread protests.

Arbitrary detention and torture

40. Sudan committed to "carry out prompt, independent and thorough investigation of the allegations of torture and excessive use of force by State officials as well as other human rights violation, including sexual abuses" (138.91). However, the use of arbitrary detention and torture is still widespread practise across various police, security forces, and military units, with the police themselves holding the most limited scale of authority when handling citizen matters within their jurisdiction.

Political participation

41. Women are excluded from decision-making at all levels, and minority groups, especially those from historically marginalized regions such as Darfur, the 'Two Areas' (South Kordofan and Blue Nile), Abyei, and Eastern Sudan, are likewise underrepresented in government. Meanwhile, DWAG observes that prominent political and religious leaders continue to make public attacks on women, for example labeling as "anti-Islam" women who are appointed to the transitional government.

Equality before the law

42. Half of the population in Sudan—women and girls—are unequal before the law. For example, the testimony of two women being needed to counteract that of one man in certain trials before a judge. Likewise, a widow can only inherit one-eighth of her husband's estate, with the remainder going to the children; Even then, a two to one majority share would be inherited by the sons versus the daughter. Legal measures also include adultery charges for Muslim women that choose to marry a non-

Muslim man, but the lack of penalty in the reverse situation for men.

43. Failure to implement positive changes in the law: The TLC has not been formed as of May 2020, government led GBV/VAW mitigation efforts have not materialized, economic conditions have not stabilized, and free healthcare has not been established. Constitutional changes have not been locally adopted, as well as their lack of substantive impact for women. Resistance to legislative change from leading religious figures affiliated with the former regime. Politician Abdullahi Yousif, in violation of the 2019 constitution, directed attacks of “being anti-Islam” against young women who have been formally appointed to serve in the transitional government.

44. Sudan should:

- Ensure that Bashir, Hussein, Haroun, and others accused of atrocity crimes are held accountable, including, if need be, surrendering them to justice in the Hague.
- Create genuinely independent and thorough investigative mechanisms for the June 3 massacre and for other major attacks in Darfur and the Two Regions, and ensure that these bodies are comprised of and empower diverse representatives of the social groups affected by the violence.

i. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:

Right to development and corresponding rights for specific persons and groups.

45. There is a huge gap in the periphery with systematic underdevelopment being a deliberate policy of the previous regime. Either low or missing essential services in politically marginalised areas. Interim Government has done nothing to resolve this. Current government has not announced any plans to equalize access to government services: PM Hamdok, who has emphasized his plans for Sudan’s national development in his speeches, does not discuss periphery regions in his speeches.

Adequate standard of living

46. Deliberate bad infrastructure and lack of communications in the periphery. DWAG’s operational experience finds that roads in certain areas of Darfur are purposefully kept at a low level of maintenance to hamper transit. The issue is exacerbated in wet season whereby flooding as a humanitarian crisis has gone unaddressed by the government. Communications – telephone, WiFi, etc. -- are purposefully kept

underdeveloped to isolate Darfur; days can pass without adequate service.

47. The government has not worked to create an enabling environment on the ground. DWAG's operational experience finds significant administrative barriers -- especially a requirement which requires demonstration of 30-40 members in the same location -- for national organisations to formally register in country. Remnants of the surveillance apparatus from Bashir-era is still in place for NGO workers. The Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) requires the registration of vital equipment such as satellite phones. Foreigners must have a permit to travel outside Khartoum. Government Intelligence (GIS) has been known to ask questions about project work.

48.

People from out[side?] of Sudan have come and occupy lands of IDPs who fled due to instability, lots of fighting now over land rights. Government has not shown any commitment to addressing this. IDP camps are entirely funded by humanitarian organisations.

Health

49. Pervasive health inequalities persist in Sudan. People living in the periphery do not have access to adequate health care services, which are concentrated in Khartoum, even as COVID has spread to these regions. DWAG's field office notes that Darfuris who previously relied on UNAMID hospitals in El Fasher, and then Zalingei, now face a gap in medical access. Women frequently face disproportionate health impacts: in times of starvation, thirst, and disease, women and men face the same dangers but women face cultural pressures to additionally serve as caregivers for other family members, and often give up resources in favor of men (who are seen as providers) and children.

Right to work

50. Women are economically disempowered and deprived of control over key resources necessary for subsistence, including land ownership, paid work, and critical assets such as smartphones/internet. Generally speaking, they are expected to be subservient to men, private, and secluded, with responsibilities and time allocated to their husbands and families. This leads to disproportionately negative impacts on women in times of crisis and conflict. Only 25.15% of working age females participate in the labor force compared with 71.35% of their male equivalents. A significant gender wage gap is reported to exist in instances where women do work. Women's lack of access to economic opportunity also means that, when confronted with lockdown measures, they may be forced to remain in uncomfortable or abusive conditions.

51. Sudan should:

- Recognize and address, including through corrective high-level policies and reparations, the foundations of gendered violence that lead to human right violations including social, economic and political inequality, VAW/GBV, increased exposure to grave human rights violations during conflict and crisis.
- Empower the Women and Gender Equality Commission and the Human Rights Commission to independently examine and make recommendations to respect, protect and promote economic and social rights through government law and policy, practice, and leadership, with special attention to ensuring equality for marginalized groups on human rights and gender equality.
- Undertake systematic efforts for education, awareness-raising, and attitudinal changes on women across Sudanese society.
- Document and monitor GBV and VAW incidents to help guide improved institutional functioning to prevent and respond to GBV.
- Engage in institutional gender-mainstreaming and sensitization training to change patriarchal culture of armed forces that leads to gendered violence against civilians;
- Implement Constitutional commitments to equitable health care.

III. Capacity-building and technical assistance

52. The international community should:

- Refrain from supporting military capacity due to Sudan's many risk factors for atrocities.
- Act to close gaps in civilian protection left after closure of UNAMID;